The Value of Life 211smaller if the quantity of enjoyment lags behind the sum
of desires. But as long as the numerator (the enjoyment)
has even the slightest value, the fraction can never equal
zero. If, before dying, I were to make a final account, and
mentally distribute over my whole life both the quantity
of enjoyment related to a particular drive (for example,
hunger) and the demands of that drive, then the pleasure
experienced might have a very slight value, but it can
never be quite valueless. Given a constant quantity of en-
joyment, a creature’s increased needs diminish the value
of the pleasure in life. The same applies to the totality of
life in nature. The greater the total number of creatures in
relation to the number whose drives are fully satisfied,
the lower is the average value of the pleasure in life. Our
shares in life’s pleasure in the form of instincts fall in val-
ue when we cannot hope to cash them in for the full
amount. If I have enough to eat for three days and then
must go hungry for the next three, the pleasure of those
three days of eating is not diminished. But I must then
think of it as distributed over the six days, so that its value
in terms of my food drive is reduced to one half. It is the
same with the amount of pleasure in relation to thede-
gree of my need. If I have enough hunger for two pieces
of buttered bread but I only get one, then the pleasure de-
rived from it has only half of the value that it would have
if I had been satisfied by that one piece alone. This is how
thevalue of pleasure in life is determined. It is measured
against life’s needs. Our desires are the yardstick; plea-
sure is what we measure. The enjoyment of being satis-
fied has value only because of the existence of hunger. It