The Value of Life 213those who are starving, and to the totality of pain arising
indirectly, for such people, from lack of food. And, if
pessimists want to extend their claim to nonhuman na-
ture as well, they can point to the sufferings of animals
who starve at certain times of the year because of lack of
nourishment. Pessimists claim that such ills far outweigh
the quantity of enjoyment brought into the world by the
drive for food.
Doubtless, we can comparepleasure andpain and de-
termine the surplus of one or the other, just as we can with
profitandloss. But, if pessimists believe that an excess
exists in the column of displeasure, and infer the worth-
lessness of life from that, then they err in making a calcu-
lation that is never made in real life.
In a given instance, our desire is oriented toward a spe-
cific object. As we have seen, the greater our pleasure is
in relation to our desire, the greater is the value of plea-
sure in satisfying the desire.^7
But the quantity of pain that we are willing to accept in
order to attain the pleasure also depends on the magnitude
of our desire. We compare the magnitude of the pain not
with the pleasure, but with the magnitude of our desire.
Someone who takes great pleasure in eating will, because
of enjoyment in better times, be able to sustain a period of
hunger better than someone who lacks this joy in eating.
A woman who wants children does not compare the plea-
sure of having one to the quantity of pain in pregnancy,
- We disregard here the case where, due to excessive increase in
pleasure, it turns into pain. (Author’s note)