The Value of Life 217whether, despite the presence of the bad ones, the good
ones still retainsomevalue.
Just as I disregard the bad apples when I enjoy the good
ones, so I give myself up to the satisfaction of a desire af-
ter having shaken off the unavoidable suffering.
Even if pessimism were correct in its claim that there is
more pain than pleasure in the world, this would have no
influence on our willing, for living creatures would still
strive after whatever pleasure remains. Empirical proof
that pain outweighs joy (if it could be given) would in-
deed demonstrate the fruitlessness of the philosophical
position that sees the value of life in a surplus of pleasure
(eudemonism), but it could not demonstrate that our will
is itself unreasonable; for our will aims not at a surplus of
pleasure, but at the quantity of pleasure that remains after
the pain has been endured. This always appears as a goal
worth striving for.
Attempts have been made to refute pessimism by assert-
ing that it is impossible to calculate the surplus of pleasure
or pain in the world. Calculation is possible only if we can
compare the magnitudes of the elements of the calculation.
Every pain or pleasure has a specific magnitude (intensity
and duration). We can even compare the approximate
magnitudes of different kinds of pleasurable sensation.
We know whether a good cigar or a good joke gives us
more pleasure. There can be no objection to comparing
different kinds of pleasure and pain with regard to their
magnitudes. Researchers who make it their business to de-
termine the surplus of pleasure or pain in the world pro-
ceed from thoroughly justifiable premises. We may assert