Appendix I 247In a treatise by Eduard von Hartmann, “Ultimate Ques-
tions in Epistemology and Metaphysics,”^1 my book is
classed with philosophical works based on “epistemolog-
ical monism.” Von Hartmann dismisses this standpoint as
impossible for the following reason.
According to the way of thinking he develops in his
treatise, there are only three possible epistemological po-
sitions. We can remain at the naive position that takes per-
ceived phenomena as real things outside human
consciousness. In that case, we lack critical awareness.
We would be unaware that the content of consciousness
is, after all, only in our own consciousness. We would not
see that we are dealing not with a “table-in-itself,” but
only with the object of our own consciousness. Whoever
remains at this standpoint, or after reflection returns to it,
is a naive realist. But this point of view is untenable, pre-
cisely because it fails to see that consciousness has no ac-
cess to objects outside consciousness.
Alternatively, we can survey the situation and fully ac-
knowledge it. And, in this case, we become transcenden-
tal idealists. As such, we have to deny that anything of the
“thing-in-itself” can ever enter human consciousness. But
in this way, if we were sufficiently consistent, we would
be unable to escape absolute illusionism. The world con-
fronting us would transform itself into a mere sum of ob-
jects of consciousness; indeed, the objects of our own
consciousness. And we would be compelled, absurdly, to
- “Die letzten Fragen der Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik,”
Zeitschrift fuer Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, vol. 108, p. 55.