Appendix I 249some form of naive realism. If the answer is “inter-
mittent,” then it is transcendental idealism. But if
the answer is that they are continuous on the one
hand (as contents of absolute consciousness, or as
unconscious mental pictures or as possibilities of
perception), and intermittent on the other hand (as
contents of limited consciousness), then transcen-
dental realism is established. 2. If three persons are
sitting at a table,how many instances of the table
are present? Whoever answers “one” is a naive
realist; whoever answers “three” is a transcenden-
tal idealist; but whoever answers “four” is a tran-
scendental realist. Of course, this last example
presupposes that we may combine under the com-
mon heading “instances of the table” such dispar-
ate things as the one table as thing-in-itself, and the
three tables as perceptual objects in the three con-
sciousnesses. If this seems to be too great a free-
dom, he or she will give the answer “one and three”
instead of “four.” 3. If two persons are alone in a
room together,how many instances of those per-
sons are present? Whoever answers “two” is a
naive realist; whoever answers “four” (namely, an I
and an Other in each of the two consciousnesses) is
a transcendental idealist; but whoever answers
“six” (namely, two persons as things-in-themselves
and four persons as objects of mental picturing in
the two consciousnesses) is a transcendental realist.
Whoever wanted to prove that epistemological
monism is a standpoint different from these three