Conscious Human Action 13poet-philosopher Robert Hamerling expresses this idea
incisively:
Human beings can certainly do what they will—
but they cannot will what they will, since their will-
ing is determined by motives. They cannot will
what they will? Let us look at these words more
closely. Do they contain any reasonable meaning?
Must freedom of the will then consist in being able
to will something without having grounds, without
a motive? But what does willing mean other than
having grounds to do or attempt this rather than
that? To will something, without grounds, without
motive, would mean willing something without
willing it. The concept of motivation is inseparably
linked to the concept of the will. Without a deter-
mining motive, the will is an emptycapacity: it
only becomes active and real through the motive.
Thus it is quite correct that the human will is not
‘free,’ inasmuch as its direction is always deter-
mined by the strongest motive. But it is absurd, in
contrast to this ‘unfreedom,’ to speak of a conceiv-
able ‘freedom’ of the will that involves being able
to will what one doesnot will.^5
- Robert Hamerling (1830-1889)Atomistik des Willens (Volume 2, p.
213 ff.) Hamerling was an Austrian poet, philosopher, dramatist, and
schoolteacher in Vienna, Graz, and Trieste. He was an acquaintance of
Rudolf Steiner. See “Robert Hamerling, Poet and Thinker” inThe
Presence of the Dead(Hudson, NY: Anthroposophic Press, 1990). See
alsoRudolf Steiner, An AutobiographyandKarmic Relationships, vol.
II (London: Rudolf Steiner Press, 1974).