referent of Taoist non-being. Yet it is a substance and is permeated by principle,
li, which governs everything down through the multiplicity of things. Being is
the functioning of the original substance; but regarded apart from its function-
ing, it is a purity that can be thought of as non-being. Wang Pi’s philosophy,
interspersed as commentaries on earlier texts, is not developed very systemati-
cally, but it shows unmistakably the push toward a consistent metaphysical
interpretation to overcome the paradoxical tone of the Taoist classics.
The intellectual community at midcentury had become dense and competi-
tive. One faction (Wang Pi, Wang Tao, Ouyang Chien, and others) maintained
that ideas can be fully expressed in words, while an opposition led by Yin
Jung defended wordlessness. Here we find an epistemological debate of the
sort rarely reached in Chinese philosophy. Wang Pi seems to have made the
most sophisticated formulation. He distinguishes ideas as a realm that can be
grasped by means of symbols (such as the Yi hexagrams) and words; once the
words and symbols have served their purpose, they can be dispensed with
(Fung, 1952–53: 184–186). Wang seems to have recognized the nature of
abstraction in its own right, beyond the symbols through which it is expressed.
Having clarified this distinction, he holds that, contrary to Taoist mysticism,
words and symbols are completely adequate to express ideas. In conjunction
with other remarks in which both non-being and the original state of the
universe are identified with the mind (Rump and Chan, 1979: 109; Chou Yi
Commentary, quoted in Fung, 1952–53: 181), this suggests that Wang Pi seems
to have been considering a position in the direction of a Platonic idealism.
There was a concerted effort to redevelop the cultural capital of the various
pre-Han texts as consistent philosophical positions. At this time were produced
the first major editions and commentaries on the Chuang Tzu, as well as the
compilations of reconstructed (or forged) classics, the Lieh Tzu and the Yang
Chu, representing the opponents of the older Confucian tradition. The argu-
ments of Hui Shih and Kung-sung Lung and of the Mohist logicians were also
revived, and played a part in philosophical debate; they were attacked by Wang
Pi and defended a generation later by Kuo Hsiang. Independent rationalists
and skeptics flourished, along with developments in mathematics and empirical
science. What we find (visible in Figure 4.4 as the biggest network cluster in
four hundred years) is a dense, competitive intellectual community, in which
the major philosophers have direct connections with their opponents, and
vertical chains across the generations go on from the Confucian rationalists of
the late Han down to the early 300s. These exemplify the structural conditions
for creativity on the level of abstract philosophy, in contrast to the philosophi-
cally static rivalries or at best particularistic religious developments in the
surrounding centuries.
The metaphysicians of this period are much more than “Neo-Taoists,”
172 •^ Intellectual Communities: Asian Paths