elements. But the nature of these items is indiscernible, an indexical “suchness.”
Ashvagosha raised this “suchness” to the ultimate reality of the universe and
identified it with the “womb of Buddha,” tathagatagarbha; it was a monist
origin from which pluralism emanated through the traditional 12–link chain
of causation. Ashvagosha’s “suchness” provided an alternative path between
Sarvastivada realism, Sautrantika nominalism, and the somewhat inconsistent
mentalism of some of the Mahasanghikas.
A generation or two later, Nagarjuna eclipsed Ashvagosha while taking
much the same space among the opposing philosophies. Whereas Ashvagosha
seems an ambiguous precursor to Mahayana, Nagarjuna was the great Ma-
hayana standard bearer, giving his theological movement a famous success in
the most recondite philosophical arguments. For Nagarjuna, ultimate reality
was not merely “thusness” but shunyata, emptiness. This was in keeping with
the emphasis on emptiness in the Lotus sutra, the leading Mahayana scripture,
finished during or shortly after Nagarjuna’s lifetime. Nagarjuna, however, did
not leave his position simply as a negation; not only did this sound like a
pessimism which he did not wish to imply, but also negation would have been
on the same level of analysis as the realism of the Sarvastivadins, which he
combatted, and the constructs of other philosophical factions.
Nagarjuna rose to a meta-level. He defended a position which may be
regarded as classically Buddhist; but he acquired his great personal reputation
not merely as a conservative overturning the accretions of the Abhidharma
scholastics, but by introducing an explicit concern for the standards of argu-
ment. All arguments hinge on a concept of identity, the nature of the items
that are argued about. Nagarjuna undermined identity by using the classic
Buddhist model of causality: all things are caused by dependent origination;
therefore nothing has an essence of its own, standing outside the stream of
causation; therefore everything is void. Identity turns out to be the same as
shunyata (Nakamura, 1980: 247–249; Sprung, 1979: 4–11; Streng, 1967;
Robinson, 1967). Nagarjuna’s criterion of being is like Parmenides’: the self-
existent must not be dependent on anything else; but—unlike in Parmenides—
no such thing exists. Nagarjuna used this argumentation to refute the realism
of the Sarvastivadins. There is neither future nor past nor any motion; every-
thing is substanceless. By Nagarjuna’s strict criterion, no concepts are intelli-
gible. Hence, Nagarjuna could assert these skeptical statements as a positive
doctrine. His omni-negation applies to his own philosophy, holding itself to
be a “theory of no-theory.” Like some Greek Skeptics, Nagarjuna sought
tranquillity through disengagement from intellectual positions; but, unlike the
Greeks, he had an institutionalized religion to defend. One must operate with
levels of two-fold truth: the truths of religious life within the world, and the
ultimate truth of Mahayana, which is inexpressible.
Nagarjuna’s doctrine is called “Madhyamika,” the superlative of the mid-
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