the wealth of the church made it a target for periodic persecutions and
confiscations. This too had its European parallels: the suppression and confis-
cation of the Templars by the French king in 1307, and the secular takeover
of monastic properties in the Protestant Reformation. Until the end of the
T’ang, Buddhism had considerable resilience. The successive persecutions hit
hardest at the gentry Buddhists at the top of the church, leaving the popular
base intact; and the economic usefulness of its organization usually allowed
the elite superstructure to rebuild when political winds again blew more
favorably. The wealth and power of Buddhism fed the antagonism of Taoists
and Confucians. Confucians as state officials attacked Buddhism for withdraw-
ing resources from the taxable control of the state. Taoists were vulnerable to
the same charge, but their poorer monastic organization made them a less
tempting target. At the same time, their emulation of Buddhism put the Taoists
in a direct competition over status, which made them the prime instigators of
the persecutions of Buddhism. On occasion, pro-Buddhist reactions resulted in
counter-suppressions of Taoists, though without much long-term effect. By the
early Sung, the Chinese market economy had far outgrown the Buddhist sector,
and neither government nor aristocracy depended much on its material organi-
zation. The centrality of Buddhism within China came to an end; and with its
decline, so too declined its Taoist imitation.
Intellectual Foreign Relations of
Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism
During periods of weakness in their external fortunes, the “foreign policy” of
these religions downplayed philosophical differences with their rivals. Con-
versely, strongly based religions became aggressive, scorning syncretism and
attacking their enemies. From 165 to 400 c.e., when Buddhism was cautiously
making its way into China, it tended to syncretize, especially with Taoism. A
leading Buddhist monk maintained contact with the Taoist-oriented “Pure
Conversation” circle in south China, translating Buddhist terms with Taoist
terminology. Copyists borrowed almost word for word from the Tao Te Ching
in translating Buddhist texts: “Emptiness [sunya] that can be made empty is
not true emptiness” (Zürcher, 1959; Demiéville, 1986: 839–840, 866–867).
The process helped to mold what became the “Taoist” classics increasingly
toward the mystical side and away from their political or magical interpreta-
tions. Chinese intellectuals with an interest in mysticism were at first inclined
to favor Buddhism as an intellectual ally. Taoism was just becoming organized,
and had as yet no clear intellectual identity. Nor was Taoism politically
powerful. The Taoist churches which organized political rebellions among the
peasantry with millennial appeals merely added another military faction to an
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