commentaries on the Vedic hymns, but also for new mythological collections
(the Puranas down through 1500 a.d.) and poetic epics (the Mahabharata ca.
300 b.c.e.–300 c.e., and the Ramayana ca. 200 b.c.e.–200 c.e.; O’Flaherty,
1975: 17–18). Judaism, after the destruction of the Jerusalem temple in 70 c.e.
and the dispersion of Jewish communities, developed an accretion of religious
law and interpretation, the Mishnah, which was collected and codified in
several editions between 200 and 500 c.e. (Segal, 1986: 16, 133–136). The
Talmudic literature of the famous teachers continued to grow; the systematiz-
ing efforts of Maimonides and his successors around 1200 attempted again to
reduce this material to a simpler conception of orthodoxy, but there was no
agency to enforce it.
Christianity and Islam stand out because the organizational conditions were
present relatively early to close their holy canons.^1 It was here that the relations
between religion and philosophy became explicitly an issue. In these circum-
stances a crucial topic of philosophy must be the relationship between “faith”
and “reason.” This in turn gave impetus to questions of epistemology. When
religion is armed with coercive political power, the range of answers is limited;
the prudent thinker is forced to claim either that reason and faith harmonize,
or if they do not, that faith is superior. Bold advocates of the independence of
philosophy, if protected by enough organizational insulation, or if they find
chinks in the system of political enforcement, might push the border.
The philosophical path which starts here may continue farther. A crucial
push is given when such epistemological issues are taken up by theological
conservatives. Once elaborate metaphysical constructions are produced across
several generations of philosophers, the intellectuals who are closest to the
space of conservative dogmatism can turn philosophical sophistication against
itself by raising the epistemological level, and can question the validity of
arguments within the realm of reason itself. We find this in Islam with al-
Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyah, and in Christendom with the conservative condem-
nations of 1277 leading to the refined positions of Scotus and Ockham. If the
philosophical community continues under religious challenge, further positions
are generated, and the field is propelled into a full-fledged epistemology. This
is much more apparent in Christendom than in Islam, where the fundamentalist
attacks increasingly constricted the philosophers, and the sophisticated conser-
vatives themselves lacked technically oriented followers; the significance of the
issue disappeared with their opponents. The result was reinforced because of
the tendency of later Islamic intellectuals to take refuge in a secret doctrine
accessible to the initiates of reason, while scripture was taken as metaphoric
expression for the crude masses. This removed the creative tension of argument
with the orthodox; the esotericism of later Islam turned to a poetic mysticism,
and away from the analytical issues of epistemology.
Tensions of Ideas: Islam, Judaism, Christendom^ •^389