Free will is only a semi-deep trouble; it arises from tensions which derive
from accepting a particular theology. Over a period of generations, exploration
of free will uncovers more generic deep troubles built into concepts themselves.
This is the problem of relations among unlike substances, or more generally
the problem of ontological plurality; this leads to the issues of causality and
occasionalism. At a still higher level of metaphysical acuteness, the deep trouble
becomes reformulated as one of being and contingency. We see this driving
force clearly in the case of Islamic philosophy.
The first important issue around which intellectual networks formed in the
early 700s was a dispute over reconciling the omnipotence of God with
responsibility for moral evil. The faction of rational theology (kalam) elabo-
rated a conception of God as having a rational nature, and therefore adhering
to an ultimate standard of good; evil was thereby attributed to human free
will. The opposition of scriptural literalists who arose in response took the
stance that free will is a limitation on the power of God, and concluded for
predestination. These same circles of argument launched proofs of the unity
and power of God as omnipotent world creator, sharpening anthropomorphic
monotheism to where the deep trouble came out in full bloom. On this problem
space emerged the first set of famous Islamic intellectuals.
The MuÀtazilite faction which emerged in the third and fourth generations
of kalam moved onto metaphysical grounds in order to defend simultaneously
free will and the proofs of God’s unity and power. The result of this combina-
tion was the occasionalist doctrine of divine intervention in a world composed
of time-atoms. The free will argument led to a refined theory of causality, the
modes by which God intervenes in the world; while the proofs of God’s unity
led to breaking apart the concepts of substance and its attributes. Dirar rejected
bodily substance; the body is only a collection of attributes, with some attrib-
utes built on others (e.g., being round is built on having a shape, and so on).
There is no distinction of substance and attribute, since every substance is
infinitely divisible (a line of argument reminiscent of Buddhist nominalism).
Dirar’s rival MuÀammar took a stance somewhat like Buddhist Abhidharma
realism: attributes are only the aggregation of underlying bodily atoms; but in
keeping with Islamic monotheism, MuÀammar held that God creates human
bodies by creating the atoms of which they are composed. This allowed a
defense of free will and of God’s justice, since God is only indirectly responsible
for the attributes of human bodies, and is not responsible for their good or
evil qualities. Abu-l-Hudhayl went on to distinguish which kinds of attributes
exist only momentarily in time, and which ones are relatively permanent;
among the latter must be will and motion, life and knowledge, which are
necessary if there is to be a responsible human entity existing across time. These
Muslims did not wish to dissolve the person into a fleeting aggregate, in effect
Sequence and Branch in the Social Production of Ideas^ •^839