intellectual communities, then argue that the cause of their eminence is this
connection? The answer is no; there is less circularity than meets the eye. It
can be shown that the model is not simply required by our implicit definitions.
For one thing, there are empirical exceptions. In the Greco-Roman world,
the important isolates from chains of significant followers are Heraclitus, Philo
of Alexandria, and the Skeptic Aenesidemus. In China, the major isolates are
the anonymous author of the Tao Te Ching, and the Han dynasty philosopher
Tung Chung-shu; and among secondary figures, the early “legalist” politicians
Shen Pu-hai and Shang Yang (both fl. 350 b.c.e.), and the Han dynasty
rationalist Wang Ch’ung. Moreover, there are a number of cases of “twilight”
creativity, when the most distinguished achievements are made at the end of
the line, lacking even minor pupils to carry them on. Augustine is the prime
example in the Greco-Roman orbit; in Islam, Avicenna (Ibn Sina, fl. 1120).
Hegel, who overrated the prevalence of the pattern that “the owl of Minerva
flies at dusk,” was apparently thinking of himself as an exemplar, but his own
pupils proved him wrong.
It is also possible to conceive of a historical pattern in which eminent
philosophers are not contemporaries, nor personally connected in chains, nor
members of the same organizations, nor concentrated in the same places. That
such structures are empirically found is not due to a conceptual tautology.^15
I have argued that in a sense reputation is not really distinct from creativity;
that what we consider intellectual greatness is having produced ideas which
affect later generations, who either repeat them, develop them further, or react
against them. It does not follow as a matter of definition that a great thinker
is one who has a personal network of eminent followers; hypothetically, one’s
ideas could affect later generations without this personal transmission. Having
said this, I would add that it is possible to assess whether some individuals
received more retrospective eminence than they deserve, in the sense that they
did not really produce the ideas which are later attributed to them.
This kind of renown is especially likely for originators of chains. Thales is
traditionally regarded as the first Greek philosopher and the first mathemati-
cian; but it is not at all clear that he was a very innovative intellectual in his
own right. He is counted as one of the “Seven Sages” of antiquity; but the
oldest source that gives him this title is Plato, 200 years later.^16 The other
“Sages” are not strictly what we would call philosophers, but primarily poli-
ticians who were known for their astute practical judgment and their pithy
sayings. Solon, Thales’ contemporary and probable acquaintance, was some-
what more of an intellectual in that he was both a law giver and a poet, but
others such as Pittacus or Bias of Priene were simply famous politicians. As in
these other cases, Thales was known for his political advice at a time when
Networks across the Generations • 69