42 The Economist February 26th 2022
China
ThecrisisinUkraineChoosing sides
S
ome sawit as a pivotal moment in Chi
na’s relationship with Russia, and in
deed in the crisis over Ukraine. On Febru
ary 19th Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister,
speaking by video link to a conference in
Munich, declared that the “sovereignty”
and “territorial integrity” of countries
should be protected, adding, lest anyone
misunderstand, “Ukraine is no exception”.
It sounded like an affirmation of interna
tional norms, just as Russia’s president,
Vladimir Putin, was about to shatter them.
But three days later, after Mr Putin re
cognised two separatist enclaves within
Ukraine as independent republics and
promised to deploy Russian soldiers to de
fend them, it became obvious that Mr
Wang had been presenting only a veneer of
highminded diplomacy. As America and
Europe imposed sanctions on Russia, con
demning Mr Putin’s assault on Ukraine’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity, China
called on “all sides” to exercise restraint
and “avoid continued escalation of the sit
uation”. On February 23rd the foreign min
istry’s chief spokesperson, Hua Chunying,
said America was making the situation
worse by “sending weapons to Ukraine,heightening tensions, creating panic and
even hyping up the possibility of warfare”.
Ms Hua, an assistant foreign minister, ac
cused America of expanding natoto Rus
sia’s doorstep, asking “Did it ever think
about the consequences of pushing a big
country to the wall?”
Two weeks earlier China had been even
more emphatic in its support for Russia.
On February 4th Mr Putin came to Beijing
for the opening ceremony of the Winter
Olympics. That day he and his Chinese
counterpart, Xi Jinping, issued a joint
statement that signalled the countries’
strongest ties for 70 years. There were “no
limits” to the friendship between the two
countries, the statement said, and “no ‘for
bidden’ areas of cooperation”. It held up
the two authoritarian powers as the true
guarantors of “genuine democracy”, while
deriding unnamed countries for seeking to
impose their “democratic standards” onothers. Crucially China, for the first time,
joined Russia in opposing further expan
sion of nato, buttressing Mr Putin’s de
mand that Ukraine be kept out of the alli
ance. As Russian troops were massing on
Ukraine’s border, Mr Xi was binding him
self more closely to Mr Putin. Will he regret
that choice now that war has broken out?
Russia and China have been growing
closer for more than two decades. Trade
surged by 35% last year to a record $147bn.
China has become the largest market for
Russian exports after the eu, buying $79bn
of them in 2021, mainly oil and gas. An ear
lier round of sanctions against Russia in
2014, after Mr Putin’s previous invasion of
Ukraine, prompted growth in economic
ties with China. An increasing wariness of
America and its allies in Europe and Asia
has also fostered military ties. Last year the
pair held big joint exercises.
Even so, the rebuke of nato, at such a
perilous time for European security, was
striking for a country that often prefers to
sit on the fence. It risks widening China’s
rift with the West. Mr Xi seems to be gird
ing for years of tension with America and
its allies, and so wants to cement closer
ties with Mr Putin, even if Russia’s behav
iour flies in the face of China’s typical rhet
oric about nonintervention.
Mr Xi surely would have preferred that
Mr Putin had not launched a fullscale war.
It will push democracies together and des
tabilise a global order in which China has
thrived. But he has cast his lot with Russia,
and probably believes he will not pay too
heavy a price. China can be expected to abChina drew closer to Russia on the eve of war. Will Xi Jinping come to regret it?→Alsointhissection
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