8 Special report Private markets TheEconomistFebruary26th 2022
equityfunds,”says JoTaylor,theotpp’s
chiefexecutive.AndreaAuerbachofCam
bridge Associates, an investment firm,
reckons coinvestment alone now ac
countsfora quarterofbiginvestors’com
mitments,upfrom10% 15 yearsago.
Aswellasgivinginvestorsmorecon
trol,directandcoinvestmentcanboost
returns.Overthepast 25 yearstheotpp’s
directinvestmentshavedeliveredatop
quartilereturnofaround20%,abovethat
ofitsinvestmentsthroughfunds.Between
2009 and2016,around80%ofallcoin
vestmentsoutperformedfundslaunched
inthoseyears,saysMichaelCembalestof
JPMorganChase.
Higherreturnsarenomystery.Direct
andcoinvestorsavoidfeespaidbyfund
investors:typicallya 1.52%management
feeand20%performancefee(themanager’s“carriedinterest”).
Institutionsthatdoa lotoffreelanceinvestingcanbring“blend
ed”managementfeesdownto11.5%.TheUniversitiesSuperan
nuationScheme,an£82bn($110bn)pensionschemeinBritain,
hassaveditsmembers“hundredsofmillions”byinvestingdirect
ly,saysGeoffreyGeiger,itsheadofpefunds.Theextrastaffcost
palesbesidethefeessaved,saysMattPortnerofMcKinsey.
Agooddeal?
gps are ambivalent about this. It means forgone fees, but it can
still be useful. Some funds would find it hard to make large invest
ments without coinvestors, because of risk limits on single hold
ings as a share of the total. Blackstone and its partners would have
struggled to complete the $34bn purchase last June of Medline, a
medicalsupply giant, without coinvestors, including gic.
Most investors pay close to the infamous “2 and 20”. Gary Gen
sler, chair of the sec, said last year that average pemanagement
and performance fees in 201819 were 1.76% and 20.3%, respective
ly, “not that different from when I was on Wall Street” in the 1980s.
Other expenses can push overall fees, including carried interest,
up to 5% or more per year over the life of a fund. These include
charges for “monitoring” portfolio companies, for administrative
expenses, or even for use of private jets. StepStone, a privatemar
kets advisory firm, memorably described pefees as “like snow
flakes: abundant, unique and lacking in transparency”.
lps don’t kick up much fuss about fees partly because they fear
being excluded from gps’ future funds or coinvestment opportu
nities. Some keep quiet because they get rebates under side agree
ments. Still, many complain that fees are too high and that the fee
structure is rigid even though funds’ performance varies. Others
grumble that fees are charged on all committed capital, not just
that actually deployed.
Some gps seek to assuage such concerns. A few have switched
to charging based on funds deployed. One large investor predicts
that pewill eventually follow hedge funds: when relative returns
sagged after the financial crisis, some hedge funds closed, others
turned into family offices, and many of the rest cut fees.
Yet 2 and 20 is likely to stay as pe’s reference point. “The way
the buyout and venturecapital markets are rationed is that man
agers of underperforming funds struggle to raise more money and
fade away rather than staying in business by slashing fees,” says
Steven Kaplan of Chicago University’s Booth business school. The
head of one American endowment’s peportfolio says that, if any
thing, there is greater pressure on lps to pay more than 20% car
ried interest for good results than to pay less than 20% for below
average results. Some investors will pay 25% or more if the manag
erdeliverssomethingspecial,suchasfour
timestheoriginalinvestment.
The biggest factor limiting pressure
fromlps forlowerfeesistheirfaiththat
unlistedinvestmentswillcontinuetoout
performpublicmarkets.pefirmstoutdiz
zyingreturnsoverthepast 20 years.Aca
demics who crunch the data are split,
thoughnotdownthemiddle.Asmall,vo
calminority,ledbyLudovicPhalippouof
Oxford’sSaidBusinessSchool,arguesthat
pe’s outperformanceisanillusioncreated
byanindustrythathasmasteredwaysto
massagethenumbers.Overthepastdec
ade,MrPhalippoucalculates,returnshave
merely matched those of stockmarkets.
Forgps toinsistotherwiseamountsto“a
missellingscandal”.
Mostotherboffinsdisagree.They ac
knowledge that the “internal rate of return” (irr) measure fa
voured by the industry is flawed: it can be gamed by playing
around with cashflows or by taking out “subscription lines”, loans
that managers get from banks to delay calling capital from lps.
However, the academics have developed their own, more solid
metrics. The best of these is “direct alpha”, a less manipulable,
marketadjusted version of irr.
A paper in January from the Institute for Private Capital at the
uncKenanFlagler Business School calculated direct alpha since
the mid1990s for funds in the 19862016 vintages. It found that pe,
including buyouts and vc, outperformed shares over all time pe
riods (three, five, ten, 15 and 25 years) by 26 percentage points. It
beat them regardless of the benchmark used; the authors tested
among others the msci’s globalequities index, the Russell 3000
index of usstocks and a smallcap value index.
The less good news is that the performance gap has narrowed.
As private markets get more crowded, competition for standout
investments intensifies. And as the industry gets bigger, it learns
the truth of Warren Buffett’s dictum that “no one in the world can
earn 20% with big money.” The real question, says Gregory Brown,
the study’s lead author, is whether private assets are worth it once
returns are adjusted for risk. pe’s “beta” (risk relative to markets) is
2030% higher than that of equities. Investors also demand a pre
mium for illiquidity (the consensus is around three percentage
points a year, says the bis). Against this, investors must weigh the
diversification benefits of holding private assets.
Even if institutional investors conclude that pepays, average
returns are just an average. Pick a belowaverage fund and you can
be soaked in red ink. The gap in performance between top and
bottomquartile pefunds is wider than in public markets: for
some vintages 15 points or more. Onefifth of peinvestments re
turn less than was put in, reckons one privatemarkets adviser.
Picking winners is made harder by a weakening of the link be
tween past and future performance. The odds that a pe manager’s
next fund will be in the top quartile if its
previous one was have fallen over time, to
“not much better than 25%”, as the indus
try has grown, says Mr Jenkinson. And in
formation about past performance is often
incomplete: investors must decide wheth
er to back a manager’s next fund three or
four years after the previous one started in
vesting, long before its final returns are
clear. Even in the highest reachesofprivate
markets, investing is as much aboutkeep
ing the faith as studying the form.n
The gap narrows
Global buy-out funds, direct alpha by vintage, %
Source:InstituteforPrivateCapital,
UNCKenan-FlaglerBusinessSchool
15
10
5
0
-5
1995 2000 05 10 16
Fund vintage
↑ Outperforms stocks
↓ Underperforms stocks
pe, including
buy-outs and vc,
outperformed
stocks over all
time periods