50 The Economist February 26th 2022
Europe
TurkeyandRussia
Frenemies
T
raffic on theBosporus, the waterway
that splits Istanbul and connects the
Marmara and Black seas, has been busier
than usual of late, and more dangerous.
Making their way past supertankers, pas
senger ferries and the occasional pod of
dolphins are Russian warships heading
north towards Ukraine. Since the start of
February, at least six Russian amphibious
assault ships, as well as a Kiloclass sub
marine, have passed through. Russia now
has four such submarines in the Black sea,
each armed with missiles capable of strik
ing targets anywhere in Ukraine.
Few countries are watching the war for
which these weapons were deployed as
anxiously as Turkey. Its government, head
ed by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is
eager to preserve a recent rapprochement
with Russia. “We cannot give up” on either
Russia or Ukraine, Mr Erdogan said on Feb
ruary 23rd. But Russia’s actions may end up
forcing his hand. The following day, as
Russian bombs began falling on Ukraine,
Turkey’s foreign ministry called the inva
sion “unacceptable” and “a grave violation
of international law”. It had already de
nounced Russia’s recognition of separatist
enclaves in Ukraine. The war will test the
relationship, possibly to destruction.
Turkey’s most immediate concern is its
economy. Mr Erdogan, who has helped
drive inflation to over 48% and maimed
his currency with illjudged interestrate
cuts, is eager for lots of foreign cash from a
busy tourism season, lower energy prices
and some measure of regional stability.
Russia’s actions in Ukraine seem to have
torpedoed such prospects. Russians and
Ukrainians accounted for over a quarter of
foreign visitors to Turkey last year. This
summer, presumably, far fewer will show
up. Western sanctions against Russia, one
of Turkey’s main trading partners and its
main supplier of natural gas, will deal the
economy a separate blow. The war has al
ready sent shudders through Turkish mar
kets. On February 24th the lira was headed
for its worst day this year.
Turkey does not want to antagonise
Russia. The last time it did so, by shooting
down a Russian warplane near the border
with Syria in 2015, the Russian response, a
mix of sanctions and threats, was robust
enough to force a rare apology and a range
of concessions from Mr Erdogan. What fol
lowed was a thaw in relations, marked by
new energy deals, cooperation in Syria,
and Turkey’s purchase of an s400 air de
fence system from Russia. Russia has since
tried to peel away Turkey from nato, while
Turkey, estranged from its Western part
ners, has looked to Russia to advance its re
gional interests.
Remarkably, the rapprochement has
survived the assassination of Russia’s am
bassador to Turkey, as well as wars in Lib
ya, Syria and Azerbaijan in which Turkey’s
proxies have squared off against Russia’s.
The two powers cooperate whenever pos
sible and confront each other where neces
sary, though almost never directly. “It’s like
capoeira,” says a European diplomat, refer
ring to a stylised Brazilian martial art.
I STANBUL
Turkey’s rapprochement with Russia may not survive the war in Ukraine
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