The Economist February 26th 2022 Europe 51
“Each side is doing its dance,sizingupthe
other, but there’s alwaysthedangerthey
will come to blows.” Whentheydo,oneof
them (usually Turkey) findsa waytoscale
back. When a Russian airstrikekilleddoz
ens of Turkish troops stationedinSyriain
2020, Mr Erdogan ordereda bombingcam
paign against Syrian regimeforces,butnot
Russian positions. Turkeyhasalsobeensi
lent about Russia’s anticsinBelarus.
But Turkey considersUkrainea strate
gic partner. It opposed Russia’sannexation
of Crimea, backed Ukraine’splanstojoin
nato, and shared its concernsaboutRus
sia’s naval buildup in theBlacksea.Tur
key also sold Ukraine dozensof armed
drones, vexing Mr Putin.Earlierthisyear,
Mr Erdogan and Volodymyr Zelensky,
Ukraine’s president, signeda newdefence
cooperation agreement. The war will
make it difficult for Turkeytobalanceits
commitments as a memberofnatoandits
warm relations with Russia, says Alper
Coskun of the Carnegie EndowmentforIn
ternational Peace, a thinktankinAmerica.
Turkey’s backing forUkrainehasalrea
dy helped the countrybuffitstarnished
nato credentials. American diplomats,
used to taking Turkey totaskforitshu
manrights record, are praisingitsstance
on Ukraine. It helps thatTurkeyhasbegun
to mend fences with theuae, EgyptandIs
rael, all of them Americanallies.
Russia has ways of temperingTurkey’s
support for Ukraine, however.Nowhereis
this as clear as in Idlib, aprovinceinnorth
east Syria packed withover3mcivilians
and controlled by Islamicextremists.Two
years ago, Turkey, whichbackstheinsur
gents, and Russia, whichbackstheSyrian
regime, agreed to a ceasefire.Thatstopped
a regime offensive that wouldhavepushed
the insurgents and millionsofrefugeesto
wards Turkey’s border.Sincethestartof
the crisis in Ukraine, ceasefireviolations
have picked up, officialsin Ankara say.
This is not a coincidence. They believe
Russia is weaponising therefugeesagainst
Turkey. “The RussiansseeIdlibasasoft
spot for Turkey,” says oneofficial.“They’re
sending a message, thatifwedosome
thing they don’t like [inUkraine],theycan
make our lives difficult.”
Mr Erdogan said earlierthisyearthat
Turkey would do whateverisnecessaryasa
nato member in the eventofa Russianin
vasion. But in practice there isonly so
much Turkey is preparedtodoforUkraine.
Recently one of the primeminister’stop
advisers suggested thatTurkeywouldnot
align with foreign sanctionsagainstRus
sia, calling them “useless”.InsteadTurkey
had tried to position itselfasapossible
mediator between RussianandUkraine—a
notion that now seemsnaive.MrErdogan
would have loved to preservecosytieswith
Russia, but the war in Ukraineislikelyto
prove the end of the affair.n
TheFrenchelection
Bills topay
F
or the past few months, rivals in
April’s French presidential election
havedwelttoexcessonquestionsofna
tional identity and immigration. This
shouldsoonshift.EmmanuelMacron,a
former economyminister andonetime
investmentbanker,isexpectedshortlyto
confirmofficiallythatheisrunningforre
election.Thisislikelytoturnthefocusto
theeconomy.Voterswillbejudgingnot
onlyMrMacron’seconomicmanagement
sincehetookofficein2017,buthowheand
his rivals plan to improvecompetitive
ness,jobcreationandincomes.
As the French economy rebounds,
growthhasexceededexpectations.Aftera
contractionof8%in2020,gdprecovered
to prepandemic levels last autumn.
Growthin 2021 reached7%,itsfastestrate
foroverhalfa century,andbriskerthanin
Germany,ItalyandSpain.Thiswaspartly
thankstogenerousgovernmentsupportto
keepbusinessesgoing,peopleinjobsand
incomes protected. The injection of
€100bn($113bn),or4%ofgdp, partlyfrom
theeu’s recoveryplan,hasalsohelped.
OnMrMacron’swatch,Francehasalso
becomealotmorebusinessfriendly.He
hascuttaxesonbusinesses,replacedthe
wealthtaxwithanarrowerpropertytax,
introduceda flattaxonfinancialincome
andcourtedforeigninvestors.Forthepast
fiveyearshehasstucktothesamefiscal
policyandthesamefinanceminister:Bru
noLeMairehasbeeninthejoblongerthan
anyonesinceValéryGiscardd’Estaingin
196974.In 2019 MrMacronpromisedthat
by 2025 therewouldbe 25 French“uni
corns”,ortechfirmsvaluedatover$1bn.
Thatfigurewasreachedthreeyearsearly,
inJanuarythisyear.
Perhapsmostsurprising,theFrenchjob
marketisdoingrelativelywelltoo.Unem
ploymentinthefourthquarterof 2021 fell
to7.2%,downfrom9.2%whenMrMacron
tookoffice.Thisisnotprincipallyowingto
governmentsupport:thenumberofpeo
pleonfurloughschemeshasfallenfrom
8.4minApril 2020 to420,000inDecember
lastyear.Itlargelyreflectsthestrengthof
privatesector job creation. One reason,
saysPhilippeMartin,oftheCouncilofEco
nomicAnalysis,anindependentadvisory
body,ispastlabourmarketreforms,par
ticularlythosein2017.Amongotherthings
thesecappedthecosttoemployersofre
dundancypayments.Insteadofprompting
more layoffs, as some economists had
feared,thishasmadefirmsmorewillingto
hirestaffonpermanentcontracts.
The government has also invested
heavilyintraining.Thenumberofappren
ticeshipshasrisenfrom290,000in 2017 to
a record720,000in2021.Theemployment
rateof1564yearoldsactuallyincreased
duringthepandemic.Evenolderworkers
nowstayattheirdesksforlonger.Forthe
5064yearolds,theemploymentrateisat
itshighestlevelsincethenationalstatis
ticsbodystartedmeasuringit in1975.
Yet thereare two weakpointsto Mr
Macron’seconomicrecord.Thefirstisthe
stateofpublicfinances.Whenthepan
demictookhold,hevowedtodo“whatever
it costs”,and hedid. The government’s
budgetdeficitwasstill7%in2021,andthe
levelofpublicdebtreached115%ofgdp, ac
cordingtoofficialestimates.Francenow
belongstothegroupofthemostindebted
countriesintheeurozone,alongsideBel
gium,Greece,Italy,PortugalandSpain.
France has nodifficultyservicing its
debt.ButMrMacronhasyettoshowthat
hehasa plantoreduceit.ValériePécresse,
the centreright Republicans’ candidate
andhismostcrediblecriticontheecon
omy,hasaccusedhimof“burningthrough
cash”.Shepromisestorestorefiscaldisci
plineandcuta net150,000jobsfromthe
5.6mstrongcivilservice.
P ARIS
Ahealthyeconomy,ailing
publicfinances
Bouncing back, at a price
Source:Eurostat
20
10
0
-10
-20
2017 21201918
QuarterlyGDP,%changeonyearearlier
France
Euroarea
15
12
9
6
3
0
2017 18 19 2120
Budget deficit, % of GDP
France
Euro area