The Economist February 26th 2022 55
BritainInternationaltrade
A more flexible approach
T
he department for international
trade (dit) is certainly busy. On Janu
ary 13th AnneMarie Trevelyan, the inter
nationaltrade minister, launched new
talks with India. Just over a month later, on
February 18th, she announced progress to
wards her goal of joining the Comprehen
sive and Progressive TransPacific Partner
ship (cptpp), a trade deal with 11 countries
around the Pacific Rim. A digital deal with
Singapore is imminent. A cruel observer
might dismiss all this as a shallow demon
stration of the country’s postBrexit free
doms. A kinder one might note that, al
though it is not yet perfectly formed, Brit
ain’s trade policy is at last maturing into a
more workable form.
Part of the evolution happened inevita
bly as Britain moved through the process of
Brexit. The first task that ditfaced when
Theresa May set it up after the June 2016
referendum was to roll over the freetrade
agreements that Britain had signed up to
by virtue of being a member of the Euro
pean Union. Out of 39, it has now managed
an impressive 33. But some of these were
done only by agreeing to temporary provi
sions and delaying a full renegotiation.
Now, negotiators are working out where
they need to tidy up, which in general
means reviewing the biggest and oldest
ftas. The agreement with Mexico, for ex
ample, is ripe for an update, as its provi
sions on services do not match up to the
most modern standards.
Broader progress has happened simply
through practice. The government was
forced to start rebuilding its trade capacity
pretty much from scratch. As of September
2021 there were 521 fulltime equivalent
ditstaff directly responsible for negotiat
ing and implementing trade agreements.
One person who follows discussions at the
World Trade Organisation closely says
that, although British representatives in
Geneva were active right from the begin
ning, it was mainly to show that they were
no longer just part of the eudelegation.
Now, it seems, their interventions are
more substantive.
Canny negotiators tend to gather and
deploy information to their advantage—as
do their business stakeholders as they seek
to influence the direction of trade talks.But much to the frustration of the second
group, a terror of leaks has stifled dit’s in
formation sharing. In July 2020 the depart
ment set up Trade Advisory Groups, as a
more formal way of liaising with the out
side world. Lobbyists still complain that
officials often use meetings only to give
updates on what they have already agreed,
rather than to find out what they should be
asking for. Still, it seems that engagement
has improved.
Politicians have also learned that
achieving the vision of postBrexit Britain
as a buccaneering freetrader is not quite
as easy to realise as it sounds. The Trade
Remedies Authority (tra) was designed to
make independent recommendations on
defensive tariffs for the minister to accept
or reject. But just weeks into the new sys
tem, the government passed emergency
legislation allowing it to apply stronger
protection for steel than the trahad rec
ommended. Now the entire framework is
under review. Pacific dreaming
At least the approach to trade deals dis
plays elements of consistency. Although it
took a while to become visible, political
leaders have long coveted membership of
the cptpp. Deals done with the likes of Aus
tralia and New Zealand mean that some of
the heavy lifting has already been done. Yet
it will not make much of a splash. Exclud
ing partners with which Britain already has
trade deals, joining the cptppwould cover
trade worth only 0.4% of Britain’s exportsBritain’s post-Brexit trade policy is slowly maturing
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56 Climatepolicy
58 Bagehot:NHScrisishitsTories— Read more at: Economist.com/Britain