70 Finance & economics The Economist February 26th 2022
leaving the fund with an evergrowing
share of the tab.
In the past the imfused its convening
power to cajole richer members into forgo
ing some of the money they were owed. In
2020 its efforts yielded the Debt Service
Suspension Initiative, through which 73
lowincome countries became eligible for
a temporary moratorium on debt pay
ments. By the end of the programme in De
cember last year nearly 50 countries had
opted to make use of it, freeing some $10bn
they could use to meet urgent needs. Sepa
rately, the imfalso suspended some debt
payment on loans it had made itself to 29
very poor countries.
But such suspensions do not make un
derlying debt loads more sustainable, be
cause the delayed principal and interest
payments remain due. Thus a new g20 ini
tiative, referred to as the “common frame
work”, was rolled out in November 2020.
Its utter failure to gain traction—so far
only three countries have sought relief un
der its auspices, and none has completed
the process—illustrate the new political
pickle the imffinds itself in.
The framework was intended to provide
a broad set of principles which could be ap
plied to individual countries in need of
debt relief. Crucially, it was meant to ex
tend beyond lenders from the “Paris
Club”—richworld governments which
have long cooperated in cases of sover
eign insolvency—to include private credi
tors and countries like China, India and
Saudi Arabia. These, however, have largely
refused to play ball. That is a big problem.
Whereas a decade ago Paris Club members
still provided the bulk of credit to poor
country governments, China is increas
ingly bankrolling them: its disclosed lend
ing (which probably understates the true
total) amounts to roughly half the money
they owe to other governments.
Restructuring such debt is extremely
hard. Views differ within China as to
whether and how much debt relief to pro
vide to overextended borrowers. Many dif
ferent Chinese institutions are involved in
foreign lending, not all of which are keen
to help. And many poor countries are re
luctant to seek relief from China, lest they
cut themselves off from future access to
Chinese financing or otherwise antagonise
the Chinese government.
Yet without participation from other
lenders, the imfis in a bind: under pres
sure from richworld politicians to do
more to help struggling economies, yet
often unable to provide programmes that
put countries on a path towards stable fi
nances. Some critics suspect that the fund,
squeezed in this way, has occasionally in
dulged in excessive optimism about coun
tries’ prospects in order to justify its lend
ing. In January Kenneth Rogoff, a former
chief economist of the imf, wrote that the
fund’s permissiveness risked transform
ing the institution into an aid agency. A re
cent, tentative agreement between the imf
and Argentina, to refinance $45bn owed to
the fund, drew widespread criticism for
the vagueness of the path it sketched for
eventual repayment of the loan.
The fund lacks good alternatives. Fail
ure to reach a deal with Argentina might
well have meant financial disaster for that
country and lost the imfbillions. Its lead
ers could perhaps be more vocal in calling
for China to be more lenient. But the West’s
reluctance to increase the country’s 6%
voting share at the imf, to a figure match
ing its new economic might, has made Chi
nalesswillingtolisten.Andthewindow
forgettingChinadeeperintothetenthas
probablyclosed,becauseitsrelationswith
theWesthavedeterioratedsomuch.
In the1990sthe imf andthe World
Bank,capitalisingona momentofinterna
tionalbonhomie,marshalledtheHeavily
Indebted Poor Countries Initiative,
throughwhichlumpsofdebtowedby 37
economieswere forgiven—withmost of
thefundingcomingfromcreditorcoun
tries.Thesumsneededtodayarenothuge,
but getting theworld’s big countries to
agreeonanythingseemseverharder.On
February18thag 20 meetingendedwithno
firmcommitmentto expanddebtrelief.
Thatbodesillfortheimf. Withoutglobal
cooperation,itisfastbecominga shadow
ofitsformerself—justliketheeerilyquiet
districtwhereitsofficesstand. n
GolddemandinIndia
Karat and stick
C
ovid-19 hit India hard, leaving mil
lions jobless and struggling to get by.
Yet Sachin Rana, who runs a jewellery stall
in New Delhi’s Malviya Nagar market, says
sales have been booming since lockdowns
ended. After months in isolation, consum
ers were keen for a blowout during Diwali,
a festival in November. A bumper wedding
season has followed, creating plenty of oc
casions to wear jewellery or give it as a gift.
The pandemic has proven that “Indians
will never stop buying gold”, says Mr Rana.
Pentup demand for pendants and parties
pushed bullion sales to the highest on re
cord in the last quarter of 2021, reckons the
World Gold Council, an industry body that
has tracked consumption since 2005. Indi
ans picked up around 340 tonnes of gold
over the period, equivalent to the weight of
five healthy Indian elephants every week.
India’s special relationshipwith gold
predates covid19, of course. It is the
world’s secondlargest market for the yel
low metal, behind China, though it pro
duces almost none at home. This is partly
driven by tradition. Brides are given jewel
lery as part of their dowry and it is deemed
auspicious to buy bullion around certain
religious festivals. It is a handy store of un
declared wealth, too, often stashed in
wardrobes or under the mattress.
But the pandemic has also affirmed an
investment advice passed on over genera
tions: park savings in gold as a rainyday
fund. In the past two years many families
have made ends meet by selling jewellery,
ornaments, bars and coins at pawn shops
and informal markets. Others have bor
rowed against the stuff. The three largest
nonbank financial companies offering
gold loanssaw their assets jump by 32%,
25% and 61% year on year, respectively, in
2020.Gold’s appeal as a safe haven is only
rising: as tensions escalate in Ukraine, its
price is approaching records.
This insatiable appetite is a worry for
policymakers. Vast gold imports can desta
bilise the economy. During the 2013 “taper
tantrum”, when India’s foreignexchange
reserves were lower than they are now, a
rush of gold imports helped push the cur
rentaccount deficit to 4.8% of gdpand fu
elled worries of a currency crisis.
Savings stashed away as idle gold could
be put to more productive use elsewhere.
Indian households hold 22,500 tonnes of
the physical metal—five times the stock in
America’s bullion depository at Fort Knox
and worth $1.4trn at current prices. The av
erage family has 11% of its wealth in gold
(against 5% in financial assets).
The government has tried using sticks
to push people away from bullion. Import
duties hover around 10%, even after cuts in
last year’s budget aimed at keeping smug
gling in check.
It is also experimenting with carrots
that lure savers away from physical gold.
The central bank has ramped up issuance
of sovereign gold bonds, which are denom
N EW DELHI
India’s booming demand for bullion is
worrying the government
Booming business, rain or shine