of human nature are feelings (qing) and desires (yu ̈). Cua ( 1977 )
categorizes Xunzi’s feelings into three types: moods such as joy,
sorrow, and pleasure; emotions such as love, hate, anger, and envy;
and bodily feelings such as feeling hungry and cold. Experiencing
these feelings naturally inclines people to take certain actions to
express or to satisfy desires aroused by those feelings. Xunzi argued
that ‘‘it is the inborn nature of man that when hungry he desires
something to eat, that when cold he wants warm clothing, and that
when weary he desires rest – such are essential qualities inherent in his
nature’’ (Xunzi, Book 23: 23.1e). Besides feelings, people are born
with basic desires; for example, the sensory desires such as those of
the ear and the eye for music and beauty. More importantly, people
are born with a desire for gain (hao li), that is, a propensity to seek
benefits to satisfy their desires. Feelings and desires are intimately and
closely related in that desires may arise in response to feelings, both of
which stimulate purposeful albeit reactive and instinctive actions for
their expression and satisfaction. Cua ( 1977 : 378; 1978 ) therefore
insightfully frames Xunzi’s inborn human nature as the ‘‘basic motiva-
tional structure’’ in that it is made up of feelings and desires that
incline people to engage in self-benefiting activities in order to satisfy
those feelings and desires.
Contradicting Mencius, who believed that humans are born good,
but become bad when they lose their human goodness, Xunzi held that
humans are born evil, but become good when they modify their
evilness through learning. While Mencius viewed learning as evidence
of human goodness and as a means of preserving and nurturing human
goodness, Xunzi restricted human nature to what cannot be learned
and human goodness to what is learned and acquired through inter-
vention after birth. Mencius held that children do not have to learn to
love their parents. Xunzi argued that when a son goes hungry so his
father can eat and labors tirelessly so his father can rest, the son is
violating his natural instincts so as to follow social and moral require-
ments of righteousness. Mencius asserted that reason and moral prin-
ciples please our minds just as fine meats please our mouths. Xunzi
reasoned that preferences for fine smell and good taste are inborn but
preferences for reason and morality are learned. A poor person who
knew only coarse foods and was satisfied with them would neverthe-
less like and choose fine meats because of the latter’s better smell,
taste, and nourishment. However, a tyrant who was used to tyranny
Bridging Confucianism and Legalism 57