60 Finance & economics The EconomistAugust 3rd 2019
2 Germany between 2000 and 2015. One sign
that the less well-off claim a smaller slice of
the economic pie is that household spend-
ing fell over that period as a share of gdp.
The rich tend to spend a smaller share of
their incomes than the poor. German ty-
coons are also thriftier than their peers
elsewhere. Though Germany’s authorities
tend to blame an ageing society for its high
savings rate, the true culprits appear to be
the moguls of the Mittelstand.
Germany’s tax system does little to
counter these trends. Revenues from prop-
erty taxes are relatively low and falling. Re-
forms in 2009 excluded business wealth
from inheritance tax. As wealth accumu-
lates, the share of income flowing to the
rich rises, further widening inequality.
Government officials say that some of
these trends are reversing. The labour mar-
ket has tightened, allowing wages to rise
and profits to fall. But the imfreckons that
in order for disposable household incomes
to regain their 2005 share of gdp, wage
growth would have to outstrip nominal
gdpgrowth by 1.5 percentage points for the
next decade—a tall order.
Policy could speed things along: tax re-
lief for low-income households to reduce
the concentration of income, and property
and inheritance-tax reform to reduce the
concentration of wealth. But that would
mean recognising that a much-vaunted
economic model is in need of repair. 7
Germany
Gone askew
Sources:IMF;OECD
Share of the top 1% in total net household wealth
2014 or latest, %
0 1020304050
United States
Netherlands
Germany
Denmark
Britain
Norway
France
Spain
Australia
Italy
Japan
Greece
Income share
of top decile, %
Current-account
balance, % of GDP
19922000 1610
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
19922000 1610
32
30
28
26
24
T
he laughing stopped long ago. Be-
tween 2007 and 2013, in online chat-
rooms called “Three Way Banana Split”,
“Essex Express ’n the Jimmy” and other rib-
ticklers, currency traders yapped about all
sorts of things—including market tactics.
The banter has cost their employers dear.
Banks have been fined over $10bn for mar-
ket-rigging by American and European reg-
ulators, including €1.1bn ($1.2bn) by the
European Commission in May. An Ameri-
can class action cost 15 banks $2.3bn. But a
lawyer’s work is never done. On July 29th
Scott+Scott, an American law firm, filed a
collective-action case at the Competition
Appeal Tribunal (cat), an antitrust forum
in London.
Cases like this are still a novelty in Brit-
ain, despite a theoretically helpful change
in competition law in 2015. Collective
claims may now be brought to the caton
an “opt-out” basis, in which members of a
specified class are included in the claim
unless they choose not to be. If a monopo-
list rips off its customers, it may do lot of
harm in total, but the damage to each may
be small. Given the cost of going to court,
many may not bother suing. But the easier
a collective-action case is to bring, the like-
lier they are to gain redress.
The expense of bringing a case to the
cat—and the risk of defeat—are borne by a
newish breed of firms specialising in fi-
nancing litigation. If an action succeeds,
claimants (if they are traced) get their
awards in full. The financiers are paid out
of undistributed damages.
Therium Capital Management, estab-
lished in 2009, is backing the foreign-ex-
change case. British-domiciled compa-
nies, pension funds and other investors are
included automatically, unless they opt
out (foreign claimants must opt in). Cases
are led by a representative who may or may
not belong to the class. The forex suit is
fronted by Michael O’Higgins, a former
head of Britain’s Pensions Regulator. Mr
O’Higgins estimates the damages to be at
least £1bn ($1.2bn).
Few collective cases have yet reached
the cat. One, against a maker of mobility
scooters, was withdrawn in 2017. Two in-
volve claims by hauliers against lorry
manufacturers. In another, a consumer
champion argues that railways are, in ef-
fect, charging commuters into London
twice for the part of their journey that over-
laps with Transport for London’s network.
By far the biggest case is heading to Brit-
ain’s highest court. The representative,
Walter Merricks, an ex-head of the Finan-
cial Ombudsman Service, a dispute-settle-
ment body, claims that between 1992 and
2008 some “interchange” fees set by
Mastercard, though paid by merchants ac-
cepting its cards, harmed consumers be-
cause they were passed on in higher prices.
(The European Commission banned the
fees in December 2007.) Mr Merricks puts
the damage at a whopping £14bn. In July
2017 the catruled the claim ineligible, say-
ing that the damage to consumers, in ag-
gregate or individually, could not be accu-
rately assessed. In April the Court of Appeal
declared that the cathad been too hasty.
On July 24th the Supreme Court said it
would hear an appeal by Mastercard
against the Court of Appeal’s judgment.
The busy Supreme Court will not hear
the case before February and possibly not
for a year. Because it concerns the criteria
for the cateven to consider damages, its
verdict will be eagerly awaited by lawyers,
litigation financiers and consumer watch-
dogs. Whatever the outcome of the foreign-
exchange case, banks will face more bills.
Several big investors are suing on both
sides of the Atlantic, reckoning they will
win more in conventional damages claims
than from American class actions or their
British imitators. 7
Banks are in the frame for Britain’s latest collective legal claim
Class-action lawsuits
The CAT and the (alleged) fiddle