Buddhist Civilisation 145subjective orientation than Marxists do; and he describes his
methodology using a striking metaphor: ‘Not ideas, but material
and ideal interests, directly govern men’s conduct. Yet very
frequently the “world images” that have been created by ideas
have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has
been pushed by the dynamic of interest’ (Weber 1958a: 280). This
modifies Marx in two ways: First, it sees interests as basic but ideal,
specifically pointing to individual concerns for meaning and ‘salva-
tion’, and it is mentioned along with ‘material interests’. And second,
it argues that world-views resulting from ideologies, religious or
secular, can affect crucially the ways in which interests operate.
This implies a pluralism; it implies an occasional lack of fit; it
implies that there are some affinities; it describes a two-way causality:
social existence conditions the nature of religions (because human
consciousness is always in the background of material reality) but
religions also condition society (because they affect human action
which in turn changes societies).
Weber’s specific argument about the role of Protestantism, and
particulary Calvinism, in the rise of capitalism is, however, a dif-
ferent matter. He sees two basic ideological–subjective factors as
crucial for the development of a capitalist society: rationalism and
the ethically motivated individual who is oriented to economic
enterpreneurship. Rationality includes the idea of the world as
calculable and understandable and the breaking of the bonds of
magic and ritual orientation that restrict economic activity (e.g.
caste barriers to production in India, restrictions on ‘usury’ in
medieval Catholicism). Some religious sanction for rationality,
because of the previous dominance of anti-rational ideologies, is
necessary in the beginning for capitalism though once capitalism
comes into existence it can maintain rationality of this sort on its
own. The second necessary factor is the rise of individuals who are
motivated to become rational, non-luxury-loving, wealth accumu-
lating capitalist entrepreneurs, whose religion not only sanctions
worldly success but positively motivates them to seek it. This sanction
and motivation, according to Weber is supplied by Calvinism which
takes worldly success as the sign of the grace of God, and when in
the face of the awful doubt raised in the individual’s mind about
whether or not he is saved, psychologically motivates him to seek
this success, though he must behave frugally and morally, and to
take that as at least a social sign of his salvation. Again, as in the casemillennium BCE as described in Buddhist texts is only partly a slave
society; it rather rests on wage labour and monetary relationships;
it is an emerging commercial society in which religions such as
Buddhism and Jainism appeal to and justify the monetary orienta-
tion of a merchant and business class. Why should such a dynamic
and in many ways even capitalistic society precedethe more back-
ward, stable, agriculturally-oriented feudal society of the caste
system? This question is never answered. To even raise it would
have cast doubts about the theory of inevitable advancement and
development of modes of production that is assumed in Marxism.
A contemporary Marxist who defines his theory as anti-
Brahmanical and who has jumped into this debate is Sharad Patil,
who describes Buddhism as the ideological bearer of the ‘feudal
revolution’—thus countering Kosambi’s depiction of bhakti-
oriented Brahmanism as more appropriate to feudalism. But Patil’s
interpretation has equally many puzzles. He describes his theory as
‘Marxism-Phule-Ambedkarism’, because it sees India traditionally
as a caste society rather than a class society; but this seems to mean
primarily that he substitutes for the first three of the traditional five
stages the following: matriarchal tribal society, a slave system
based on dasa-Shudra slavery (the varna system), and caste-feudalism.
He sees Buddhism in India as representing the ‘feudal revolution’
because he interprets first millennium BCE society as the period
which witnessed the defeat of the slave society (the gana-sanghas)
and the older varna order by caste-feudalism. It is revolutionary
because the slavery of the dasais replaced by the more partial sub-
ordination of the Shudra in the agricultural society, and because the
emerging feudal society represents a more productive stage (Patil
1982, 1991). However, this explanation also does not explain the
capitalist features—the monetary orientation, the individualism, the
commercialisation of the society depicted in the Buddhist scriptures.
Nor does it explain why, if Buddhism was the religion of a
‘feudal revolution’, it should disappear in the face of a resurgent
Brahmanism. Patil’s thesis leaves more questions than answers.
Max Weber, who pioneered theories discussing the economic
role of religion and the linkage of capitalism with Protestantism in
Europe, represents a step beyond Marx in terms of basic theory. He
insists he is not refuting Marx so much as qualifying him, but he
nevertheless gives an independent causal role to religion. Weber
focuses much more on the analysis of individual action and its
144 Buddhism in India