Buddhism in India

Conclusion 271

nibbanaas referring to the psychological achievement of permanent

freedom from passion within the world would agree with her position.

For instance, David Kalupahana, whose important studies have done

much to make Buddhist psychological and philosophical positions

clear, has argued that rebirth was one concept that the Buddha

accepted because of his insights (Kalupahana 1994: 41–42).

Debates, however, are beside the point. All that is necessary to

legitimise the approach of Navayana Buddhism within the world of

Buddhism is to show that a Buddhism without the karma/rebirth

frame is possible and legitimate. What scholars like Burford argue

on a theoretical plane, Ambedkar’s followers are putting forward

in the social arena. There is then no way that any true Buddhist of

any school can deny that this is a form of Buddhism.

A social-historical point can be made here. The karma/rebirth

theme was a crucial part of the emerging tumultuous world of the

first millennium. It was not only taken for granted by a large pro-

portion of the philosophies, sects and religions of the time; but

to many it also seemed necessary to provide a ground for ethical

action. It was the belief in the punishments-and-rewards that

awaited the self after death that seemed to urge many into some

kind of moral action. In Semitic religions, the ground of morality

was provided by the notion of a supreme God who would sit in

judgment upon the soul. In Brahmanic Hinduism and Buddhism it

was the karma/rebirth frame that seemed to do the same. Many of

those who want to argue for (one might say, ‘cling to’) the notion

of rebirth as being a part of Buddhism do so because of their

concern for establishing a groundwork for social morality

(Kalupahana, for instance, implies this is true of the Buddha him-

self)! It is an argument that has to be taken seriously. Whether in the

conditions of the 21st century such a grounding is necessary or not

is another question—one, we might say, that history will decide.

Idealism, Materialism and Beyond

Greater problems with Navayana Buddhism may be because of an

idealistic tendency with Ambedkar himself.^3 For instance, he seems

between the themes of achieving control of passion focused on in
the Atthakavagga and those of classical Theravada Buddhism
which see nibbanaas a transcendental state and so can establish no
linkage between actions in the world and achieving it. She argues
that the value which is taught in the Atthakavaggais one of an
ethical life of freedom from desire, and that this can be achieved in
incremental steps in life here-and-now through ethical practice; the
Buddha himself provided an example of the ideal, living as such
until the time of his achieving enlightenment until his death at the
age of 80. This ideal, in other worlds, is immanent and life-affirming;
it does necessarily even require a monastic life (though that most
facilitates the achievement); and it implies no process of going
through rounds of births and deaths governed by the laws of
kamma(Burford 1991: 7–11, 183–95).
Burford contrasts these basic themes of the Atthakavaggawith
those of its commentators, who impose on it the theoretical frame-
work of classical Theravada Buddhism. This framework, as we have
seen, assumes the difference between samsara(the world of births and
deaths, governed by the laws of kamma) and nibbana,the transcen-
dental state of freedom. This leads to a contradictory situation,
because the ethical behaviour that produces ‘good’ kamma leading to
a ‘good rebirth’ is not necessarily connected with the enlightenment
necessary for nibbana. It also leads to a dualistic situation because
there are two goals, one identified with the monks (achievement of
nibbana) and one with laymen (ethical action in the world which at
best can lead to a ‘good’ rebirth). There is no necessary connection
between the two; in fact the kind of behaviour/psychological action
required for the achievement of enlightenment is almost absolutely
transcendent, removed from even the ‘good’ action that produces
‘good’ kamma. A contradiction thus results from both the karma/
rebirth framework and the characterisation of the entire round of
births-and-deaths as overwhelmed by sorrow.^2
Burford’s position has been criticised, for instance with the argu-
ment that insistence on a logically consistent single value orientation
is itself not consistent with Buddhist pluralism (Boyd 1991: 882).
Clearly, not all among those scholars who stress the interpretation of

270 Buddhism in India

(^2) This, it should be noted, identifies a contradiction that is different from that
pointed to by Ambedkar and others, i.e., the contradiction between the framework
of karma/rebirth and the principle of anatta; much of Theravada Buddhist theorising
has been devoted to resolving this particular contradiction.
(^3) This is only a tendency; Ambedkar generally is quite conscious of economic and
political factors. It can be noted that he qualifies his statement about the ‘mortal
conflict between Buddhism and Brahmanism’ by saying this is true of India—i.e. not
generally, as the statement ‘all history is a history of class struggle.’