Levirate Marriage and the Family[ ]bers of a given generation or degree of kinship: first, second, and third.
The first generation includes Ego’s father and his father’s brother, whose
relationship is based on a common immediate ancestor, Ego’s pater-
nal grandfather. The second generation includes Ego and his paternal
uncle’s son and son-in-law. The third generation includes Ego’s son and
son-in-law and the son and son-in-law of his first cousin, his paternal
u nc le’s s on.^95 The Bavli’s question concerns which “generations” are for-
bidden to testify against each other, using Ego as the point of reference:
a. Said Rav: My father’s brother cannot testify regarding me — [not]
him, his son or his son-in-law. Furthermore I cannot testify
regarding him — [not] me, or my son or my son-in-law.
b. Why [can’t Ego’s son testify in a case involving his father’s uncle]?
He is a third [generation relative and his great-uncle] is a first
generation relative. We learned [about restrictions involving]
a second generation relative and [another] second generation
relative, and we learned about a second generation relative and
a first generation relative, but we did not learn about a third
generation relative and a first generation relative!
c. The son-in-law mentioned in the Mishnah is the son-in-law
of Ego’s son [proving that the Mishnah does prohibit testimony
between a member of the third generation and a member of the
first generation].
d. Let the Mishnah teach “his grandson” [to make this point]!
e. [The Mishnah, in teaching it this way] makes the additional
point that a husband has the same status as his wife.^96This model suggests that closeness dissipates as the “lines” that connect
family members become less direct. Two second-generation males, Ego
and the son of his father’s brothers, are one generation removed from
being “directly” connected through a common father; the Mishnah ex-
pl icit ly teaches t hat t hey ca n not test i f y aga i nst each ot her. Si m i la rly, t he
Bavli’s exegesis of Deuteronomy : demonstrates that a “father,” that
is, a member of the first generation and a “son,” a member of the sec-
ond generation, cannot testify against each other. Rav, however, seems
to expand the list of prohibited relatives by making the ban reciprocal,
claiming that Ego’s sons and sons-in-law cannot testify in cases where
Ego himself cannot testify. Why, however, should Rav extend this pro-