[ ]Brothersh.... The Torah wrote “together” — together in inheritance [which
excludes defining brothers as men of the same patrilineage who
do not share a father].^26
Through these readings, rabbinic sources indicate that there are
different types of brothers. From a semantic (and biological) point of
view, any males who share at least one parent are brothers; men more
distantly related but of the same patrilineage may also be described as
brothers. From a legal point of view, this is not necessarily the case, or
rather, men may be called brothers and still not have all of the legal ob-
ligations that devolve on brothers. Men with a common father, and with
mothers whose status is such that paternity determines the child’s sta-
tus, have certain rights and responsibilities to each other, including the
right of inheritance and the obligation of levirate. Someone born after
his brother’s death cannot fulfill the levirate obligation, because while
t he t wo a re tech n ica l ly brot hers, t hey have no sha red interests; t hey had
no shared “stay” (yeshiva) in the world and they have no shared inheri-
tance rights.^27
In using the word “together” to determine our understanding of
the word “brothers,” the Bavli connects the levirate obligation and in-
heritance rights. A childless man’s heirs are his father and his paternal
brothers. In some societies, a man’s wives are part of his estate, trans-
mitted to his heirs together with his property. While this is not the case
in Jewish tradition, one might argue that the man or men who inherit
t he deceased’s estate should a lso assume responsibilit y for t he childless
widow. This argument is certainly put forth in the Book of Ruth.
Levirate serves to restore the proper sequence of inheritance, insofar
as a man’s first and preferred heir is his child. Levirate allows for the
possibility of a posthumous child and heir for the deceased, provided
by his close k in. Ironica lly, t he lev ir, in fat hering a child for his deceased
brot her, d i si n her it s h i m s el f ; t he ch i ld bor n of a le v i r ate u n ion, i f a s sig ne d
to the deceased, would take precedence over the deceased’s brothers,
including the child’s own biological father. This possibility might serve
as a powerful disincentive to perform levirate. As we shall see, rabbinic
law removed this disincentive and in so doing created other problems in
the distribution of the deceased’s estate.^28
The affirmation of the levirate bond through marriage or its dissolu-