science.org SCIENCEILLUSTRATION: DAVIDE BONAZZI/SALZMANART980 4 MARCH 2022 • VOL 375 ISSUE 6584
cern about the burden of proof of hard evi-
dence and possible retaliation by fraudsters.
This dual absence of victim and complainant
signals a low probability of being caught and
encourages intentional deviant behavior ( 3 ).
Limited sanction tools of funding agencies
Being public organizations, major Chinese
science funding agencies such as MOST,
NSFC, and MOE have their hands tied with
multiple tasks. Curbing misconduct is still
in its nascent phase in China. Given the lag
of legal authorization and specific measures
for punishment, misconduct investigators
and funding agencies often use discretion-
ary power to enforce punishments if legal
authorization has not been granted. But
there is potential risk in doing so. There
were some types of fraudulent actions that
are not explicitly prohibited on the legal
level. Except for explicitly stated limited
tools of heightening the scrutiny of grant
applications, terminating research funding,
retrieving allocated funding, publicizing
misconduct investigation, and circulating
criticism within their jurisdiction, funding
agencies have no direct influence on fraud-
sters’ salaries, employment, and career de-
velopment. In the ongoing battle against
misconduct, the potential questioning of
the legality of available policy tools and
punishment actions makes science grant
agencies reluctant to exercise penalties.
Dilemma of collective punishment
Chinese scholars and practitioners remain
split on the legitimacy and effectiveness of
collective punishment on principal inves-
tigators (PIs), affiliated institutions, and
team members. Opponents contend that it
is unfair for PIs or affiliated organizations
to shoulder the responsibility of others’ mis-
behavior. They believe that an increasing
phenomenon of blended or braided funding
across different sectors and countries makes
collective punishment even more challeng-
ing and unrealistic. The supporters, how-
ever, argue that credit and responsibility are
inseparable from the fault of omission. They
hold that responsibility is the price of honor,
and liability should not be limited to fraud-
sters per se. Through collective punishment,
the funding agencies could reclaim their
monetary losses, remind senior researchers
to safeguard the integrity of joint knowledge
production, and alert affiliations and re-
search managers of their oversight and edu-
cation responsibilities.
Enforcement diffi culties
Difficulty of enforcement is a universal chal-
lenge in sanctioning infractions, including
for misconduct investigations in the Chinese
science grant system. Inundated with mount-
ing grant applications, short-staffed public
funding agencies are inclined to support in-
novative research proposals rather than to
oversee, investigate, and sanction funding-
related misconducts that demand time, fi-
nancial support, and human resources. Over
the period of 2011 to 2020, NSFC funding
applications grew at an average annual rate
of 9.0%, in sharp contrast to a 3.7% growth
rate in the number of in-service personnel
at NSFC to handle this increasing workload
over the same period. In 2020, the NSFC
alone received 281,200 grant applications
and funded 45,700 proposals. In the same
year, the NSFC initiated 525 misconduct in-
vestigations after preliminary review; 165 re-
spondents and eight affiliated organizations
were sanctioned to various extents ( 4 ).Lack of consensus
The progress of research misconduct sanc-
tions and integrity cultivation are imbedded
in and thus affected by the national and local
cultural, economic, and political systems to
which they are oriented. Funding agencies,
research managers, and university research
ethics committees agree on the direction of
the path, but both the pace of development
and extent to which institutions can devote
resources to the mission remains debatable.
Within the Chinese science grant system, dif-
ferent agencies and awardee organizations
have not reached an agreement on the de-
marcation line between research ethics and
integrity, questionable research practices and
research misconducts, and the punitive scope
and severity for principals and accessories
involved in proven misconducts. This issue
is further compounded by shifting scientificresearch paradigms toward team science, in-
terdisciplinary integration, and collaboration
involving people of disparate backgrounds.ACTIONS
These five predicaments are inextricably
intertwined and represent great challenges
facing the Chinese science grant system to
curb misconduct, cultivate integrity, and
promote responsible research and innova-
tion. How can funding agencies address or
ameliorate these issues? I propose the fol-
lowing suggestions.Classifying gradients of misconducts
and degrees of sanctions
Chinese funding agencies need to achieve
consensus and draft measures to decidethe gradients of misconducts and de-
grees of sanctions. Bold policy cannot go
far without well-crafted design and solid
implementation. Institutionalizing anti-
misconduct reform, including classifying
misbehavior and sanctions for handling
alleged misconducts, can help, at least to
some extent, to maintain standards even
when political focus or media attention
wane, to reduce contrived randomness of
enforcement when combined with due pro-
cess and procedural justice for handling
alleged misconducts ( 5 ), and to make curb-
ing grant-relevant misconducts consistent,
manageable, and sustainable across differ-
ent agencies. Classification needs to take
the “first forgive then get tough” principle
into consideration ( 2 ). To what extent and
for how long the limited nonretrospective
rule can be applied must be clarified onINSIGHTS | POLICY FORUM