A Case Study in Accountability, District Monitoring, and School Improvement 295best practices, implementation, and turnaround schools. With many of the district’s schools
failing to make AYP during recent years, the CAPA reports provided supporting data and an
opportunity to triangulate findings at each stage of monitoring. Findings from the mandated
follow-up visits provided us with a sense of the district’s capacity for responding to a
carefully scaffolded monitoring process.
In this study, we limited our analysis to the indicators included in Instruction and Program
and Personnel, and concentrated on the data extracted from these two key DPRs since both
contain the largest number of indicators effecting teaching and learning. Data were analyzed
using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 15.0 statistical computer
software. The percentage totals for the Instruction and Program and Personnel DPRs are
included in Table 1.
FINDINGS
A careful review of district documents revealed that previous reform efforts involved
school leaders selecting low-impact strategies rather than ones likely to improve the education
of the most needy students (Brady, 2003; Wong & Shen, 2003). Further, this round of
monitoring exposed a marginal professional capacity at the central office, along with an
unruly board of education entrenched in the local political scene. These factors cascaded into
an inability to focus on the district mission and vision with a subsequent breakdown in
leadership across the district. With “powerful decision makers ...not responsive to warnings”
(Ford, 1985, p. 781) and their “refusal or inability to see problems” (Lorange & Nelson, 1987,
p. 42) the district obviated an all-inclusive focus on teaching and learning as a consequence of
its “insufficient actions” (Zimmerman, 1991, p. 22).
What Went Wrong
Absent clear and coherent policy underpinning efforts to improve student learning, district
policies and political practices undermined the good intentions of most staff. For example,
the mission statement only vaguely inferred the importance of having all students meet the
New Jersey Core Content Curriculum Standards (NJCCCS). Consequently, the absence of
clarity about what was prime, allowed other unrelated priorities to hold sway. Contributing to
this were outdated policies that were often ignored as board members focused on local
political issues rather than focus on actions that might improve student learning.
Curriculum and Instruction
The district curriculums were not aligned to the NJCCCS; were incomplete and outdated;
were not clearly articulated and/or implemented; and provided weak links to career options.
Scores on the DPR sub-sections related to curriculum and instruction corroborated these
findings. With a total score of 11 of a possible 120 points in the Instruction and Program
DPR, River City scored 1 of 14 points in the Curriculum sub-section (NJQSAC, DPR
Instruction & Program, Section B1-7) and 7 of 24 points in the Instruction sub-section
(NJQSAC, DPR Instruction & Program, Section C1-8). No points were awarded in the
Mandated Programs sub-section that includes Special Education, Gifted and Talented, and
English as a Second Language (ESL). At one point, the monitoring team expressed concern
that it made little sense to assess material that had not even been taught or, not taught well.