theorists call the “Prisoner’s Dilemma”: Even though both the U.S. and Canada
were better off cooperating, without an agreement their individual interests
pushed them toward competition – with devastating consequences for both.
At this point, fishery managers in both countries started talking withmathematicians about how game theory could offer a way out of the impasse.
Game theory models offered several insights. The most fundamental was that at
all times, any agreement had to be in the self-interest of every player involved
(i.e., every entity with bargaining power). The failure of the existing treaty to do
this for Canada is what led to its downfall.
Another insight was that although two countries were involved, the actualnumber of players was higher, because individual states in the U.S. have more
authority over their own fishing policies than the federal government does. So
Alaska, Washington and Oregon acted as separate players, with the interests of
Washington and Oregon closely enough aligned that they acted as a block. A
final insight was key to breaking the impasse: The mathematicians noted that it
wasn’t necessary for the two countries to harvest fish in proportion to their
production; instead, the essential thing was that they harvest economic benefits
from the fish in proportion to their production.
Figure 11: Pacific salmon migrate in a huge loop through US, Canadian and international waters,
before returning to their home river to spawn. This necessitates international agreements
between the countries to prevent overfishing and ensure that each country is able to harvest its
fair share of salmon. Game theory can guide the design of such agreements so that they’ll be
self-reinforcing. Credit: Getty images.