denied it. As Chrysippus explained (see Cicero, On Fate 18–
19), fate does not have to be identified with a necessity that
compels a person to do something he or she would not other-
wise consent to do. Of course the environment lays down
certain necessary conditions, but consent (sunkatathesis) to
action comes from the person’s own nature. Fate does not
fulfill its plan automatically, but coordinates the freely cho-
sen actions of humans with the circumstances. For instance,
it was fated for Oedipus to be born, but that would not have
occurred if his parents had not decided to have intercourse.
Their actions were spontaneous and, at the same time, “co-
destined” (suneimarmenon) in order to accomplish fate’s end
(Cicero, On Fate 13, cf. SVF 2.940). Augustine’s late stand-
point admitting compatibility between divine predestination
and human free will was heavily influenced by this Stoic
concept.
From an ethical point of view, a person’s behavior, ei-
ther right or wrong, depends on the strength of the soul’s
leading principle (hegemoniko ̄n), which is the spark of univer-
sal reason. The aim of human existence is to live in accor-
dance with reason or nature (homologoumeno ̄s), that is, in a
rational way. Evil doings and passions are the consequence
of a degenerated rationality, not of an independent irrational
faculty (SVF 3.456 to 480), an opinion from which Posi-
donius diverged. Even if fate has programmed everything,
the human subject remains responsible for his or her actions
and should be either blamed or rewarded by social authori-
ties (in any case, the wicked are always unhappy). The Stoics
did not believe in the immortality of the soul, but they al-
lowed souls to survive for a while apart from their bodies,
before melting away into the cosmic spirit (SVF 2.809 to
822).
RELIGION AND THEOLOGY. The early Hellenistic religious
mentality was by no means an otherworldly one; religion was
rather a consolidated social institution, and philosophy had
to take it into account. The Stoa, and all other schools, rec-
ognized this common heritage and recommended that tradi-
tional polytheistic cults be preserved, although the philoso-
pher should approach them rationally, not with superstition.
Chrysippus in particular was eager to save the supposed “ra-
tional” meaning of the ancient myths, giving them an alle-
gorical explanation, in most cases as if they were hinting at
natural or astronomical phenomena—a method similar to
the one already applied to the interpretation of the Homeric
poems (SVF 2.1066–1100; see also Cornutus, Theology).
Moreover, on behalf of the concepts of solidarity, fate, and
providence, the Stoics supported the reliability of forecasts
of the future both by means of divinatory techniques and
through superhuman revelation in dreams and visions (SVF
2.1187–1216). According to Posidonius (Fgm. 106, Edel-
stein-Kidd), the godhead does not simply intervene occa-
sionally when a forecast is sought—for instance, shaping in-
stantly the liver of every single victim in order that it may
signify something—but the cosmic sumpatheia and the order
of fate arrange things from the beginning in such a way that
a determinate liver with its natural appearance will also be
a sign related to a determinate incoming event.
Theology (in the Greek sense of “talking about the
gods”; see Plato, Republic 379a) belongs to the part of the
Stoic system named “physics” (the other two parts being
“logic” and “ethics”), that is, to the doctrine of reality (phu-
sis). The supreme God, namely Zeus, is said in religious
speech to be the all-pervading and life-giving spirit of nature.
Chrysippus etymologized quite falsely the two available accu-
satives of the God’s name, Día and Z ̄ena, respectively, from
the Greek preposition dia ̄ (throughout) and the verb z ̄en (to
live) (SVF 2.1069). Zeus alone represents the ruling reason,
which continues shaping the cyclically recurrent worlds. He
is, in a sense, a unique eternal being. All other gods are per-
ishable beings because they exist merely in the framework of
a single world and will be wiped out, as will everything else,
by the final conflagration (SVF, 2.1049, 1055). Of course
they will reappear, exactly the same, in the subsequent cos-
mic cycle. These gods were thought of as earthly elements
and forces, or even as stars and planets (SVF 1.510, 2.613,
1009, 1076).
Stoic theology is a puzzling philosophical construction,
as its contemporaries pointed out (see the discussion in Cic-
ero, On Gods). Since spirit and matter are but two aspects
of the same reality, the godhead can also be considered a si-
multaneously spiritual and material being. God is both soul
and body of the universe—reason, mind, and fate, and also
the natural substance with all its parts, phenomena, and
functions (SVF 2.1041, 1077, cf. Diogenes Laertius, 7.147).
It is not surprising that Posidonius (Fgm. 369, Theiler)
claimed the contemplation of heavenly bodies to be the true
religious act, which uncultivated people had distorted in the
worship of images. Some Stoic philosophers, however, dem-
onstrate a less abstract idea of God and a more devotional
attitude. Cleanthes, for example, spoke of Zeus as a personal
ruler of the universe, whose fatal law everyone had to follow
willingly; Seneca’s writings exhibit a deep religious feeling,
which led early Christians to imagine a friendship between
him and the apostle Paul.
ALLEGED SEMITIC ROOTS. Max Pohlenz (1959) raised the
question of whether Stoicism may have undergone a Semitic
influence due to the Eastern origin of most of its leaders.
This assumption is groundless. In the globalized Hellenistic
world, the Middle East did not mean what it does in today’s
geopolitical context, and local provenance made little, if any,
difference. The only “Semite” in the history of the Stoa was
Zenon, who belonged to the Phoenician Aramaic-speaking
minority of the island of Cyprus; other Stoics came from
Greek colonies or from highly Hellenized areas of Asia
Minor, such as Cilicia. Diogenes and Posidonius were indeed
Syrian, but their native cities had been founded by Seleucid
kings and populated with Macedonian military settlers. In
any case, all philosophers of this age, even if they were born
near Palestine (e.g., Antiochus of Ascalone, Philodemus of
Gadara), had an entirely Greek education and way of life.
8742 STOICISM