and perfect whole. Some Hindu thinkers have also denied
the reality of suffering by advocating adoption of the divine
point of view. According to the Vedantic tradition, what we
call evil or suffering is really an aspect of ma ̄ya ̄, the cosmic
principle of dynamism and individuation. This principle is
not ultimate, and the sage who attains the divine perspective
sees ma ̄ya ̄ as an illusory process that does not really affect the
eternal soul. This teaching renders the world of suffering in-
consequential.
Classical theodicies. Those familiar with the Western
religious traditions may be unpersuaded by these various dis-
solutions of the theodicy problem. They may find that some
of these positions, such as the denial that God is just in hu-
manly understandable terms, seriously jeopardize a religious
faith based on belief in God’s goodness. Other dissolutions
may seem to ignore the importance of the evil that God seeks
to overcome or may erode confidence in God’s ability to
master that evil. Yet we have seen that the alternative posi-
tion—affirmation of God’s absolute goodness and power in
a world of serious suffering—appears to be illogical. Defend-
ers of ethical monotheism, however, have usually refused to
accept this apparent illogicality. With varying degrees of self-
consciousness, they have maintained that the alleged contra-
diction between monotheism and suffering does not exist.
This view underlies the specific theodicies that have been
elaborated to defend belief in a just and all-powerful God.
The key to these positions is an understanding of what
it means to say that God is omnipotent. Typically, it is ar-
gued that while God can do anything he wills himself to do
and anything that is capable of being done, he cannot do
what is logically impossible. This is not because his power
is limited but only because what is logically impossible can-
not really be thought or conceived. Thus, God cannot make
a “square circle,” and we cannot ask or desire him to do so,
because the very idea of a square circle is nonsense. Only the
accident of language that makes a “square circle” seem as pos-
sible as a “seedless apple” leads us to think that God’s inabili-
ty here represents some limit to his power.
With this as a basis, it is further argued that the claim
that God’s goodness and power are logically incompatible
with suffering is not correct, because it is not true that an
all-good, all-powerful being would necessarily eliminate all
suffering from the world. What is true is that such a being
would want to bring about the greatest state of goodness in
the world. But creating such a state may involve the creation
of some specific goods whose existence logically entails the
possibility of certain evils, and these evils may be the source
of the suffering we see around us.
The enterprise of theodicy, therefore, essentially in-
volves the identification of those eminently valuable goods
whose existence may entail certain states of suffering or evil.
Proponents of specific theodicies usually contend that a
world without these goods would be of lesser value than one
that contains them, and so God is morally justified in having
created a world in which these goods, with their attendant
evils, exist.While those involved in the enterprise of theodicy fre-
quently focus on one good or the other in their defense of
God, theodicy is inherently an eclectic activity. A variety of
distinct values and arguments are commonly advanced to de-
fend God’s goodness. Some of the major theodicies listed
here are not even theodicies in the most precise sense since
they involve less the identification of specific values whose
existence justifies suffering than the assertion that such values
might exist. In any case, none of these classical theodicies is
necessarily exclusive of the others, and adherents of ethical
monotheism usually hold several of the following positions.
The free-will theodicy. One of the most powerful and
most frequently adduced explanations of suffering is the free-
will theodicy. Those who hold this position maintain that
a world containing creatures who freely perform good ac-
tions and who freely respond to their creator’s goodness is
far better than a world of automatons who always do what
is right because they cannot do what is wrong. Now, while
God can create free creatures, if they are truly free he cannot
causally determine what they do. To create a creature freely
capable of doing what is morally right, therefore, God must
create a creature who is also capable of doing what is morally
wrong. As it turned out, some of the free creatures God creat-
ed have exercised their freedom to do wrong, and this is the
source of the suffering we see around us. Some of this suffer-
ing is directly caused by these wicked beings, while some re-
sults when they are justly punished by God for their conduct.As easily stated as this theodicy is, it has many complexi-
ties, and it has frequently been challenged. Recent debate has
been especially vigorous. Philosophers such as Antony Flew
and J. L. Mackie, for example, have questioned the link in
this argument between free will and the possibility of wrong-
doing. Since the conduct of free beings is not unshaped by
causal factors, they contend, God might have molded human
nature and the physical environment in such a way that free
beings never do wrong. Or, they argue, since it is logically
possible for any free being never to do wrong, there is noth-
ing illogical in God’s having created a whole race of free be-
ings none of whom ever does wrong. However, other philos-
ophers, notably Nelson Pike and Alvin Plantinga, have
rejected these arguments, claiming either that they run
counter to our commonsense understanding of freedom,
which involves essentially an idea of nondetermination by
causal forces, or that they mistakenly derive from ambiguities
in what it means to say that God can create free beings who
never do wrong. While it is true, they would say, that God
can create a race of free beings none of whom ever happens
to do wrong, it is not true that God can create free beings
and bring about their never doing wrong. Whether wrong
is done depends on the beings themselves. This leads these
philosophers to the conclusion that God must expose the
world to the possibility of suffering and evil if he chooses to
create beings who are genuinely free.THEODICY 9113