A more traditional and long-standing objection to the
free-will theodicy is that it does not apparently handle the
problem of natural (or physical) evil as opposed to moral evil.
Moral evil may be thought of as states of suffering traceable
to the agency of free beings, such as war, racism, or genocide.
Natural evil is that evil or suffering that is not traceable to
acts or volitions of free beings, including such things as earth-
quakes, floods, and pestilence. Even if it is granted that this
distinction is not sharp (some of the damage wrought by
earthquakes, for example, is the result of shoddy construc-
tion techniques and other forms of human ignorance or ava-
rice), clearly there are instances of suffering utterly beyond
human control. Because this suffering is not traceable to
human abuse of freedom, these critics contend, God must
ultimately be held responsible for its existence.
Defenders of the free-will theodicy have responded to
this objection in various ways. They have sometimes traced
natural evil to the agency of demonic beings (fallen angels
or Satan) whose own malevolence results from a perverse ex-
ercise of free will. They have also sometimes argued that nat-
ural evils are ongoing punishments for wrongful acts by hu-
mankind’s first parents, so that suffering is a result of
Original Sin. Despite occasional efforts at their revival, these
responses have little currency today. As a result, many propo-
nents of the free-will theodicy find themselves forced to turn
elsewhere to supplement their defense of God. They fre-
quently resort to one of the educative theodicies.
Educative theodicies. The force of the educative theodi-
cies lies in their ability to justify at least some of the suffering
experienced by innocent persons. This suffering exists, it is
argued, because it serves to enrich human experience, to
build moral character, or to develop human capacities.
Within the broad assertion that suffering has educative
value, at least several distinct claims can be identified. It is
sometimes maintained, for example, that modest suffering
enhances our appreciation of life’s satisfactions (as separation
from loved ones can enrich moments spent with them). On
a far deeper level, it is argued that even very serious suffering
can toughen us to adversity and can help us develop depth
of character, compassion, or new capabilities. Finally, it is
common in this connection to stress the value of a world
based upon regular laws of nature. Certainly, much suffering
results from the operation of natural laws. Had God wished
to, he might have created a world in which no regular laws
existed—a world in which the flames threatening a sleeping
family suddenly turned cool. But such a world, it is argued,
would be a magical garden with little opportunity for growth
in human knowledge. The human race would forever remain
in intellectual infancy. This explanation in terms of natural
laws is also sometimes advanced to explain the puzzling
problem of animal suffering.
These educative theodicies are important, but their lim-
its are apparent. Many of life’s satisfactions do not require
suffering to be enjoyed. Good health can be appreciated
without the experience of disease. It is true, and perhaps pro-
foundly true, that serious suffering can stimulate the devel-
opment of our capacities and character. But this is not always
so. Sometimes suffering embitters, diminishes, or destroys
people. Finally, while growth in our understanding of na-
ture’s laws is valuable, we must ask whether this knowledge
can be justified if its price has been the wasting of lives down
through countless generations. What kind of education is it,
some ask, that kills so many of the students?
Eschatological (or recompense) theodicies. Many of the
difficulties of the educative theodicies derive from the brevity
of human life. If an individual’s existence were to continue
beyond death, some of these problems might be overcome.
Then, unmerited or unproductive suffering might be placed
in a larger context of experience and meaning. Eschatological
theodicies are based on the conviction that human life tran-
scends personal death and that the righteous eventually re-
ceive their full reward. (It is also frequently maintained that
the wicked receive appropriate punishment.) These theodi-
cies differ from one another on the question of just when or
how such recompense occurs. The eschaton (“last thing”) can
be envisioned as a historical epoch that begins at the end of
history, a time when the righteous are resurrected in renewed
bodies. Or it can be understood as an eternal heavenly realm
that one enters after death. In either case, eschatological the-
odicies assume that the blissful future life more than com-
pensates for present suffering.
Eschatological theodicies clearly play an important part
in reconciling many religious believers to the fact of suffer-
ing. Nevertheless, this kind of theodicy faces many difficul-
ties today. Some persons regard the idea of an afterlife as in-
credible. Others reject the idea that future bliss can
compensate for present misery. They point out that while
suffering may come to an end, the painful memory of suffer-
ing endures. Such novelists as Dostoevskii, Camus, and Elie
Wiesel have also asked whether anything can compensate for
the massive suffering inflicted on children during the perse-
cutions of recent times.
Theodicy deferred: The mystery of suffering. Long before
Auschwitz, religious believers recognized that any effort to
justify severe suffering in terms of identifiable values risks
trivializing the enormity of human anguish. Rather than re-
nounce their faith in God’s justice and power, however,
some of these believers have chosen to deny that the mystery
of suffering can be fully understood. They have preferred to
defer comprehension and to trust in God’s ultimate goodness
and sovereignty. Frequently they have connected this with
their eschatological expectations and have looked forward,
not just to recompense but to a final understanding of God’s
purposes in the world.
Very often, those who stress the mystery of suffering also
emphasize the limited nature of human understanding and
the enormous differences that exist between God and hu-
mans. This position should not be confused, however, with
the view that God’s justice is somehow qualitatively different
from our own. The latter perspective dissolves the problem9114 THEODICY