for Islamic orthodoxy at least, theodicy remains an undevel-
oped dimension of the religious life. Its place is taken by the
sentiment conveyed by the QurDa ̄nic formula “H:asbuna ̄
Alla ̄h” (“God is sufficient unto us”).
Hinduism and Buddhism. It would ordinarily not be
advisable to lump together any treatment of such complex
traditions as Hinduism and Buddhism. But where the issue
of theodicy is concerned, this approach has much to recom-
mend it since it emphasizes the fact, already mentioned, that
both traditions share a common perspective on suffering.
This is the view that suffering derives from the operation of
the automatic law of moral retribution known as karman
working in conjunction with a process of reincarnation. In
his Sociology of Religion (Boston, 1963), Max Weber charac-
terized karman as “the most radical solution of the problem
of theodicy” (p. 147), but this reflects Weber’s own broader
use of the term theodicy to cover any explanation of suffering.
In fact, because karman traces suffering to one’s own
thoughts and deeds, and because it denies the gods any in-
volvement in or control over the process of suffering, it is not
a theodicy in our sense at all. Rather, it is a fundamental dis-
solution of the theodicy problem as we encounter it in ethical
monotheism.
How decisive a resolution of the problem of suffering
are the combined teachings of karman and reincarnation
may be illustrated by a famous tale concerning the assassina-
tion of Maha ̄moggalla ̄na, a respected disciple of the Buddha.
When the Buddha was asked to explain Moggalla ̄na’s brutal
death, he replied that, while undeserved in terms of his pres-
ent life, it was altogether suited to his conduct in a previous
existence. In that life, said the Buddha, Moggalla ̄na had been
guilty of cruelly killing his elderly parents. (This tale is re-
printed in Henry Clarke Warren’s Buddhism in Translation,
New York, 1963, pp. 221–226.) The implication of this tale
is that in a world ruled by karman there is no such thing as
“innocent suffering.” All suffering (even animal suffering) is
deserved. We have seen that the free-will theodicy has some-
times tended toward this same conclusion, but in all the
Western traditions where this theodicy has been espoused,
there have always been voices affirming the reality of inno-
cent suffering. In Hinduism and Buddhism, however, these
voices have been silenced by a drive toward the total and
lucid explanation of worldly suffering afforded by karman.
A further implication of this teaching is that the gods
may be neither blamed nor appealed to when suffering oc-
curs. In Buddhism, belief in karman helps explain the subor-
dinate place of God or the gods in the schema of salvation.
Not only may divinity be attained by any righteous individu-
al, but the gods themselves, through sins that create bad kar-
man, may plunge from their lofty state. As a result, it makes
no sense to look to the gods for release from suffering, since
they are as subject to suffering as anyone else. Nor can they
be held responsible for what suffering occurs.
Hinduism appears somewhat less certain about these
conclusions. In the earlier Vedic texts, the gods are some-
times presented as powerful, righteous figures who reward
and punish human beings and to whose compassion one may
appeal. Varun:a, in particular, bears many of the marks of a
supreme deity, and it is possible to see here an implicit free-
will theodicy with human suffering traced to transgression
of God’s righteous law. Nevertheless, these lines of thought
are not developed in later Hindu thinking, and in the post-
Vedic period, when karman moves to the fore, even the gods
are subordinated to it. According to one tradition of Hindu
mythology, for example, the god Indra slays a wicked brah-
man, but, in so doing, he becomes subject to the moral pen-
alty for brahmanicide. In an effort to free himself of this bur-
den, Indra ends by inflicting suffering on human beings.
Thus, even the goodness of the gods is compromised as they
find themselves powerless before the operation of this moral
law of cause and effect. It is true that in popular and mytho-
logical traditions the gods are frequently seen as able to free
themselves from the effects of karman. They are also viewed
as able to benefit their devotees. But what power they have
in this regard does not usually extend, within the world of
karman, to helping human beings escape automatic punish-
ment for serious sin.
Neither can the gods be held responsible in these tradi-
tions for the shape of reality. Buddhism explicitly denies the
gods any role in creation. The universe is conceived of as an
ongoing, eternal, and cyclical process of becoming, and only
an error on the part of the first-born god Brahma allows him
to think himself its creator. Hinduism gives a more active
role to the gods in this cyclic process of evolution and devo-
lution. The world proceeds from Vis:n:u and is actively
brought forth by Brahma ̄. But this process is not understood
in moral terms. Instead, creation is a process whereby every
potentiality within the great God is allowed to manifest itself
in the world of differentiation. This means that everything
in creation, blessings and suffering, the gods and the demons,
all good and all evil, represent the working out of the divine
plenitude. If creation is conceived in anthropomorphic terms
at all, it is not a morally intentioned act for which God is
accountable but an expression of the deity’s spontaneous cre-
ativity or play (l ̄ıla ̄).There is, therefore, in neither of these traditions any
question of morally justifying the gods, and there is no real
theodicy. Instead, the paramount religious questions become
how (in popular Hinduism especially) one can procure some
favor from the gods, how one can produce good karman, and
how, finally, one can altogether escape sam:sa ̄ra, the world of
karmicly determined becoming. This latter question be-
comes particularly important when it is realized that within
sam:sa ̄ra suffering is virtually inescapable. While deeds that
generate good karman may lead to prosperity or bliss in some
future life, it is almost certain that such a state will not en-
dure. Because every transgression brings its penalty, and be-
cause those who are spiritually or materially well placed are
more likely to transgress, existence in sam:sa ̄ra is an endless
shuttle between momentary respite and prolonged misery.THEODICY 9119