A Drt<1IfI, Ptaa^157
ordinary intelligence, and strategic genius. I-Ie listened for signs, and when
his C\lmel had stopped and refused to budge, he had the intuition that the
Muslims would not move any further than me plain o f al-Hudaybiyyah
mat year. T he failure of me first four nego tiations and the Q uraysh's
obstinacy co nvinced him that he must be patient. He was deeply confi-
dent: in his dream, he ha d seen himself entering the sanctuary, and this
would no t fail to happen, although for the moment he could not say
when. T he pledge of allegiance mat had initially seemed to unite the
Muslims against the enemy was thus, as we have seen, to turn into a
pledge of fidelity requiring them to bear with dignity th e conditions of a
covenant for peace.. Moreo\"er, when Sunayl refused the Muslims' tv."Q habitual formulas
referring to God and to Muhammad's status as God's Messenger, the
Prophet heard his point of view and was able, at that particular moment,
to shift his perspective and see things fro m his interlocutor's standpoint.
\'\/hat Suhayl was saying was perfectly true according to his outlook. It was
indeed obvio us that if the Quraysh had acknowledged his statuS as God's
.Messenger, they would not have fought against him; th erefore, an agree-
ment on an equal footing could not possibly state an clement that would
in effect acknowledge what one side held as truth while contradicting the
other's position. The Companions, whose respec t for t he Prophet was so
deep, had been unable to immediately hear the oL,er's truth, but the
Prophet's attitude and his reasonable approach to the term~ of the cove-
nant were pregnant with spi.ritual and intellectual teaching. The point was
that the hean's relation to the truth--deep spiriruality- must never be
allowed [ 0 turn into emotio nal, passio nate blindness: reason must always
be called upon to analyze the situation, temper one's reaction, and help
establish an attentive, coherent relation to the other's truth. \";that ap-
peared as an unacceptable compromise from the sole viewpoint of th e
believers' faith was fair and equitable fro m the double viewpoint o f th e
respectiye rationalities of each of th e parties drawing up me peace treaty.
J\ Iuhammad could not humiliate th e QUfaysh in order to save the
Muslims' honor and prestige, or ~ven to take advanragl" of rhe new polit-
ical situation after the moat victory. Agreeing not to enter the sanctuar y
that rear took into accoum the Quraysh's vulnerabilif?1 and protected their
prestige, and this contributed toward long-term peace. Such peace, which
considered the general interests of both camps, was soon to turn to the