property rights should lead to investments in the resource base by better man-
agement of existing land (Otsuka and Place 2001). Although this might hold
true as a general proposition, there are several qualifications. Private forest
owners with reasonably secure rights to their land might decide to convert
some of their forest to crops or pasture. However, reasonably secure tenure,
which is normally equated with individual land rights, provides no incentives
for taking the externalities of land use into account.
It is commonly argued that poorly defined or insecure property rights
reduce the incentives to invest in agroforestry. Again, there are a number of
qualifications to this generalization. The meaning of “secure tenure” often is
wrongly perceived. Customary land tenure typically gives individual use and
income rights, whereas the transfer rights rest with the lineage, chief, or com-
munity (Ensminger 1996). This system often provides sufficient tenurial
incentives for agroforestry investments. Detailed analysis often points to
investments in land conservation and agroforestry as being constrained by
other factors, such as labor and capital constraints and high discount rates. In
a study from Benin, Neef and Heidhues (1994) conclude that “the key issues
holding up agroforestry investments in Benin would not be addressed by land
titling programmes (158).” However, they point out that land tenure can
become a key factor in the success of agroforestry programs, particularly in
densely populated areas.
A farmer’s right to the land is not fixed by the institutional environment
but is influenced by personal decisions. In extensive forms of tropical agricul-
ture such as shifting cultivation, planting tree crops tends to increase tenure
security. Tree planting becomes a strategy to claim land rights. Therefore, the
conventional argument that tenure insecurity causes deforestation is turned
upside down: insecurity becomes a reason for planting trees and investing in
land because this will boost the farmer’s claim to the land. This effect has been
documented among rubber smallholders in Sumatra (Suyanto et al. 2001). In
fact, when there is de facto open access to natural forests and land rights are
established or strengthened by planting tree crops, there are incentives for
both deforestation (chopping down natural forest) and reforestation (planting
trees rather than annuals) on the cleared land.
To summarize, the property regime is important, but its impact on the for-
est cover is not straightforward. More attention must be given to how land
rights are established and strengthened. Researchers and policymakers should
not only take into account changes in outputs and inputs when comparing
different systems but also assess their impact on tenure security. Better tenure
security should stimulate investments in existing agricultural land, reducing
the need for land expansion. But the higher expected profitability provided by
agroforestry compared with shifting agriculture also makes the investment in
forest conversion more profitable. The latter effect could further stimulate
land races (Angelsen 1999).
102 II. The Ecological Economics of Agroforestry