150 chapter four
which were mentioned earlier, were laid down by the Prophet and
exercised by his successors in the Rightly Guided Caliphate. However,
there were some modifications of the application of the Jizyah tax
starting from the Umayyad caliphate. As a result of the increase in
the wealth of non-Muslim clergies, the clergies were no longer exempt
from the Jizyah tax, though the poor and the old were still exempt,
(Al-Maqrizi, Hitti, 1963). In addition, the increase in the number of
Christians converting to Islam was said to have raised the concern
of the state, as that led to a notable reduction in the revenue of
Jizyah. Suspecting that the conversion, or part of it, could have been
an attempt to evade the tax, some province governors continued to
collect the Jizyah from the new converts (ibid.). However, the Umayyad
caliph Umar ibn-Abd-al-Azìz, Umar II, (717–720) decided to give
the newly converts the benefit of the doubt and ruled that no Jizyah
tax would be levied on converts regardless of the degree of origi-
nality in their conversion, “We were sent as Islamic preachers, not
tax collectors”, were his famous words (Al- ̨abarì). Interestingly, on
the assumption that the new convert converted on the false pretence
of accepting Islam, this convert would have to pay Zakàh instead.
This point could perhaps have been exaggerated as the financial
benefit to the new convert would be represented in only the mar-
ginal difference between Jizyah before conversion and Zakàh after
conversion. In addition, the new convert would have to take part in
military activities after conversion, either in defending the borders
or in launching new conquests. He was exempted from these activ-
ities as a non-Muslim. Conversion would not be appealing per se,
therefore, for the possible risk of loss of life, unless the share in the
spoils of war was particularly encouraging so much so that the risk
involved was justified by potential gains. Adverse collection policies
of collecting the jizyah by governors and their agents must have
existed during that time in order for medieval historians to give the
matter their attention. However, in order to highlight their dissatis-
faction with injustice in the collection policies of some governors, or
particular governors, historians had a justifiable reason to focus on
the bad practice of these governors. For example, al-Œajjaj, the gov-
ernor of Iraq (692–715) serving under the Umayyads (under Caliph
Abd-al-Màlik, 685–705, and his son Al-Walìd, 705–715) is always a
prime target for historians to attack and criticise, sometimes amus-
ingly. Because of his oddity, shrewdness, cruelty and ruthlessness,
and his biased devotion to the Umayyads against the rest of Muslims,