156 chapter five
source of state income and the concern of writers with land taxa-
tion, (d) the nature of the subject as a device that is able to project
justice, conceptually and practically, which explains why some of the
early writers were judges and jurists, (e) the special nature of taxa-
tion as a subject that embraces per se other subjects related to state
economic policies, (f ) the political dimension of taxation, an issue
that is deeply rooted in Islam as a religion that does not admit sep-
aration between religion and politics, and (g) the encouragement of
some caliphs and heads of state who commissioned work rather sim-
ilar in nature to a modern “committee of inquiry”.
The second general observation is that the work, which contained
important views on the running of the state finance, was not under-
taken by caliphs as heads of state but by jurists and professional
judges. This was in contrast to the case prior to the Umayyad and
Abbasìd caliphate. For example, we saw how the Rightly Guided
caliphs were able to formulate their juridical views, constitute their
policy and accordingly reach a decision, economic and otherwise. In
particular, we saw the second caliph Umar formulating his own opin-
ion in relation to the arrangements of the conquered lands in Iraq,
debating this view on juridical as well as political grounds and suc-
cessfully defending his policy. The significance of Caliph Umar’s
example is that not only did he use political reasons, as a states-
man, in defending his economic policy but also he argued the juridi-
cal evidence from the Qur"àn and Sunnah—the task of a jurist. The
fourth caliph was another example. In his comprehensive letter to
his province governor of Egypt, we saw him concerned to assert his
views on various matters related to agriculture, trade, industry, pub-
lic services, employment, state administration, taxation, policing, and
so on, as was shown in chapter 3. This judicially remarkable abil-
ity would not have been possible without a profound understanding
of Islamic law, Sharì"ah. This does not seem to be particularly trace-
able in the dynastic caliphates.
Furthermore, the increasing reliance on men of jurisprudence and
the desire of heads of state for these men to be seen close to the
royal court could be the product of the change in public’s percep-
tion of the royal entourage. With the exception of Caliph Umar ibn-
Abd-al-Azìz, Umar II (717–720), from the Umayyad caliphate onward
there seemed to have been a sense of feeling among Muslims that
their caliphs were no longer the piously infallible, divinely inspired,
or judicially exalted men of God. The dynastic caliphate was no