the abbasìd’s golden age 157longer a series of individual reigns deeply dependent on the personal
religious or political qualities of the caliphs, but, instead, the state
as an institution was made the focus of ideological loyalty (Lapidus,
2002). As statesmen and military leaders they lacked neither courage
nor fortitude, and some, like the first Umayyad caliph Mu"awiyah,
were renowned for their political shrewdness. However, as exalted
jurists, they were neither renowned nor qualified. Four reasons could
have contributed to that: (a) the Islamic expansion, (b) the schism
in the state, (c) the time lapse, and (d) the increasing complexity.
First, the enormous expansion of the state with the intensity of
military combat during the Umayyads and the Abbasids must have
occupied the full attention of the caliphs and left them with less
opportunity to study the complexities of the Sharì"ah.
Second, the schism in the Islamic state, first between the last
Rightly-Guided Caliph Ali and the first dynastic caliph Mu"awiyah,
then between the Umayyads and the Abbasids, must have engulfed
the leaders of the sate in the intricacy of politics too much to be
concerned about leaving jurisprudence to specialists.
Third, the continuous widening of the time gap between the
Prophet’s time and that of the caliphs with the inevitable conse-
quences of the reduction in the number of people who surrounded
the Prophet as his companion who were prime candidates for the
caliphate.
Fourth, the increasing complexity of life in general and the affairs
of the state, in particular in the post Rightly-Guided caliphate era,
which must have suggested the need for specialisation in Sharì"ah.
To clarify the last point further, the Islamic intellectual thinking wit-
nessed a particular development within the science of jurisprudence
that led to the appearance of more than one school of thought in
the Sharì"ah with its implications on economics subjects. For exam-
ple, we see the Œanafìjurist Abù-Yùsuf regarding what Caliph Umar
did in his administration of the lands of Iraq and Syria, as not nec-
essarily binding on Muslims after him. Caliph Umar, Abù-Yùsuf
argued, was not the Prophet and apart from what the Prophet did
or approved doing, to which Muslims should adhere to, Caliph
Umar’s practice in administering the state’s finance could be devi-
ated from as the need might be (Abù-Yùsuf ). Caliph Umar’s prac-
tice was the result of his own opinion reached by his self-exertion,
ijtihàd, not that of the Prophet. Other jurists would disagree with
Abù-Yùsuf, advocating that the practice and the opinions of the