The Politics of Philo Judaeus: Practice and Theory, with a General Bibliography of Philo

(Joyce) #1
io8 PHILO'S POLITICS

gation of law they had ruled with equity and laws (ouv emeiKeta Kai
M£Ta VOMUV). The true "animate law" must always be law-abiding
(VOMIMOC), and hence just (SiKaioc), by being able to correct existing law
when necessary, but in general by guaranteeing established legal tradi­
tion. His undoubted power to abrogate and alter existing laws was to be
used only in necessity. Philo could hardly regard as a necessitous change
in law the flouting of Jewish legal tradition in order to enforce Gaius'
claims to divinity." That is, Philo is deploring the abuse, not the cor­
rect application, of the theory of "animate law."
Philo has not dared to make this criticism of Gaius only on the basis
of his high-handed treatment of Jewish rights. The Romans themselves
had keen recollection of Gaius' abuse of the principle. Suetonius records
Gaius' resentment against his grandmother Antonia for giving him ad­
vice. Gaius remarked, "Let her remember that all things which have to
do with all men (omnia et in omnis) are permitted to me."^100 Again
Suetonius says:

As if he were going to abolish every function of the science of the lawyers he
would often boast about them, "By Hercules I shall see to it that they can
not give a single opinion not based upon myself."^101

Dio Cassius^102 gives a specific instance when Gaius applied this prin­
ciple of legal autonomy. On one occasion the Senate wanted to do the
same thing (abuse Tiberius) as Gaius had been doing. Gaius rebuked
them: "I, as autocrat, am permitted to do this, which for you would be
not only a crime but impiety." Philo still has his audience well in mind,


  1. I think Hirzel ("AvQCKpoc; N6ji05, Abhandlungen d. sachsischen Gesellschaft, Philol.-
    hist. Classe, XX, 52, n. 3) is wrong when he classifies this statement with Eurip., Suppl., 429 ff.,
    and Antiphon, De Caede Herod., 12-14. These passages describe the tyrant as one who uses the
    legal framework for his own advantage, which is not what Philo is saying. The passage which
    Hirzel quotes with these from Aristode (Polit., Ill, 1288a 3) is on the contrary like Philo and
    unlike the others.

  2. Caligula, 29.

  3. Ibid., 34: "De iuris quoque consultis, quasi scientiae eorum omnem usum aboliturus,
    saepe iactavit, se mehercule effecturum ne quid respondere possint praeter eum." The sentence
    is a difficult one. One would rather expect ipsum, if eum is not the corruption of some totally
    different word. The praeter is also extremely difficult, unless it is taken as I have done as a
    reflection of the v6jiOc; Iji^XO? theory. By that the sentence means that Gaius abolished legal
    science, which pronounced opinions on the basis of precedent and principle, and put his own
    person in its place. He was the basic referent of all specific legal opinion. That is to make
    Suetonius say exacdy what Philo says in his phrase: v6u,ov fiyovfievog &avx6v. The obvious
    parallel is the statement of Cicero quoted above, p. 54: "suam vitam, ut legem, praefert suis
    civibus."

  4. LIX, xvi, 2.

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