30 PHILO'S POLITICSman's defence. So in In Flaccum, after Flaccus had been disgraced,
we saw that Philo could write freely about his character and adminis
tration, as in Claudius' reign he could vilify Gaius in the most direct
way. Here Philo calls no names, but to the readers of his work as it first
appeared he made his reference clear by saying that he had known this
particular prefect "yesterday or the day before," which seems to indi
cate the prefect immediately preceding the incumbent at the time of
writing. Philo is throughout making himself as specific as he dares. It
should be noted that the sudden reference to Roman conduct of Egypt,
superficially so abrupt a departure from the general allegorical mazes of
the section, is no break at all since Philo has been talking about the Ro
mans all along. It is just that here is the first incident about which he
dared to speak directly. Its connection with the preceding is veiled in
the code language of the context.
Philo now goes on to an allegorical discussion of "empty opinion"
(K£V/) hola) and "arrogance" (TU^OC) as contrasted with "truth"
(aAyjGeia), "right reason" (o opOoc Aoyoc), and "modesty" (aru^ia).
The discussion is general, and only its connection with the preceding,
and the fact that it is these code words which he is discussing, would
suggest that Philo is still speaking of the Romans. But he begins by say
ing that such men are the chorus leaders (ol Kopu^aioi) of empty opin
ion, and the chorus that follow them do all in their power by treachery
and violence, when they see people who are trying to make their lives
shine with virtue and truth, to drag them into the land of darkness and
phantasms.^36 The virtuous ones are the followers of "right reason," in
whose service they are free, but these followers of "empty opinion"
want to take them and "right reason" itself and enslave them, though
"empty opinion" ought to be slaves to them.^37 I am not talking aboutdreams, Philo warns the reader, but about things that are like dreams.
For what seem to be great things to unpurified minds are small indeed
to minds with truth as their standard.^38 Philo does not tell the reader
what it is he is talking about, what these apparently great things are
that are really trifling. Instead he goes on to ask whether right reason in
general, and in its specific applications, can be prostituted by admitting
the superiority of "empty reason." Shall it lay aside its own ancient "ar
rogance" to prostitute itself before sham and counterfeit "arrogance"?^39
- Som., ii, 133 £. 37. Ibid., 135 ff. 38. Ibid., 138.
- Ibid., 139 f.