STATESMAN AND PHILOSOPHER 81
Similarly in a long discussion of the unreliability of our perceptions
Philo's chief illustration of human fallibility is the extreme divergence
of civil laws in the various parts of the world, so that nothing is thought
good by some that is not condemned as evil by others. In such a state of
affairs the man who accepts blindly the traditions and laws of his own
environment is little better than a slave. In this passage Philo's only con
clusion is that we must suspend judgment upon specific definitions of
the good, since even philosophers are in disagreement upon every essen
tial point.^83 He contrasts the laws of a given tribe with those of the
Olympians.^84 Human society is so corrupted by "arrogance," which
leads men into mutual injustice, tyranny, and oppression, that true law
like the Mosaic Code could not be given in a city, and had to be promul
gated in the desert.^85 In contrast to the law of Moses the laws of other
people seemed to be motivated by a myriad of pretexts, such as wars,
tyrannies, or other contingencies, or by the fact that people had dis
carded true law in time of luxurious prosperity, and come into a state of
insolence (uPpic), the antithesis of law.^86 Nor was it only the formu
lated laws of states which Philo disapproved. One who preferred cus
toms (£6*)) to laws was again only revealing his "arrogance." The in
spiration of both customs and laws lay alike in the inadequacy of ordi
nary men to develop true principles for society.^87
That is, Philo is consistently dualistic in his view of human nature
and of the two laws to which man is subject. On the one hand, by virtue
of his divine mind, man is naturally a citizen of the Cosmopolis, subject
to the divine laws of Nature. As a man of material nature he is just as
naturally given to producing civil law, and subject to its authority. But
while the two laws are both in a sense the product of Nature, there is
usually no lineal connection, much as there should be, between civic law
as it is and natural law. Our civic law is actually a travesty rather than a
reflection of Nature. Brehier^88 and Cohn^89 agree in feeling a similarity
between Philo's argument and that of Callicles in Plato's Gorgias- Ebr., 192 ff. A similar contrast is being made in QG, iv, 184, but the medieval Latin
translation differs so much from the Armenian that we cannot be sure of Philo's original
meaning. - Conf., 152. 85. Decal., 2 ff. See above, pp. 33 ff.
- Mos., ii, 12 f.
- Mut., 103 f. On the relation of %toy\ to v6jioi in Greek tradition see Hirzel, Themis, Di\e,
und Verwandtes, 378-380. - Les Idees, 14, n. 1.
- In Philos Wer\e (Bibliography no. 492), I, 165, n. 1.