CHAPTER V
KINGSHIP
P
HILO'S own relations to political life in theory and practice, if
our interpretations have been correct, were stormy, contradic
tory, and real. It remains to speak of his theories for the organi
zation of the state. In only one form of government, monarchy,
did he seem to put much hope.^1
This I say in spite of the fact that he almost invariably calls democ
racy the best form of government. But when we examine Philo's state
ments about democracy several interesting things become clear. For he
praises democracy, "the best of constitutions," in many passages, as it
manifests itself both in the soul of the individual, and in the state,^2 yet
the term democracy is not used as Plato uses it, nor as we use it. Popu
lar sovereignty, which Plato called democracy, is for Philo the lowest
type of state organization, one which he called ochlocracy, mob rule.^3
In Philo's opinion the ideal democracy recognizes that every individual
has rights which are respected, yet every individual is subject to the rule
of law and justice; and this law and justice exist as a datum, not of
popular whims, but of God or Nature. To him the wish of the multi
tude is, by definition, contrary to the Law of Nature. Tyranny and abso
lute sovereignty are equally hated.^4 But what then was democracy as he
- The most important discussion of Philo's remarks about kings and kingship is by I. Heine
mann, Philons Bildung, 182-202. As in all the subjects treated in this excellent book, Heine-
mann's chief concern is to ascertain whether Philo's ideas of kingship are derived predominandy
from Greek or Jewish thought. He concludes that there is more specifically Greek than Jewish
material in this case, but that the two traditions were here very close together, so much so that
it is frequendy difficult to tell from which source Philo is drawing. On this point the reason
for the closeness of the two traditions might have been illuminated for him from my "Kingship
in Ancient Israel," Journal of Biblical Literature, XLVIII (1929), 169-205. Heinemann draws
exclusively, for Philo's remarks on kingship, from De Specialibus Legibus, and so concludes that
when we discuss the subject we must be very careful in any attempt "aus seinen Angaben auf
die praktische Durchfuhrbarkeit, geschweige auf die tatsachliche Durchfuhrung seiner Ideale zu
schleissen" (p. 202). We must indeed be "vorsichtig" in drawing any scholarly conclusions, but
I do not think, in view of Philo's statements, that Heinemann has fully understood Philo in
stopping where he does.
- Virt., 180; Spec, iv, 237; Immut., 176; Agr., 45 ff. See Geiger, 52-59; but Geiger has not
distinguished between Philo's praise of democracy "in the soul" and his more literal intentions
in speaking of government.
- Conf., 108 ff. Philo's various denunciations of ochlocracy are collected and discussed by
Geiger, 53 f. Oligarchy is in Decal., 135 f., 155 likewise thrown out.
- Abr., 46, 242; cf. LA, iii, 79 and the many references to tyranny, all unfavorable, given in
Leisegang's Index, 787 f.
