intervene in local affairs, and Chinese power would be used where
Chinese interests were at stake. China’s readiness to use force thus
stood as a warning to any ruler in Southeast Asia who might disturb
the existing order.
Later Ming–Southeast Asia relations
The reign of the Yongle Emperor was by any account a remarkable one.
By the time he died in 1424, the dynasty was at the height of its power,
the empire was prosperous and at peace (though the Mongol threat
remained), and China enjoyed diplomatic relations with sixty-seven
overseas kingdoms and principalities. Indeed, Chinese sea power
reached further beyond her frontiers than ever before or since, to dom-
inate not only the Nanyang, but also much of the Indian Ocean as far
west as the African coast. Under Chinese naval protection, seaborne
trade flourished, bringing wealth not only to the tribute ports of south-
ern China, but throughout the empire wherever goods for export were
produced or imports traded.
Yet as we have seen, even during the Yongle Emperor’s reign,
Chinese attention had again shifted north. This was due to both exter-
nal and internal factors. Externally, Turks and Mongols continued to
pose a threat to the security of the empire. Internally, scholar officials
succeeded in contesting the power of the court eunuchs. The great
voyages were criticised for their cost and extravagance, and those asso-
ciated with them lost influence. Finances were required for the army
and for building the new capital with its imposing Forbidden City.
Zheng He’s voyages were not the only cost involved in Yongle’s
southern strategy. Vietnamese resistance had continued since 1406,
and substantial Chinese reinforcements had had to be dispatched. The
most effective resistance centred on the mountains west of Thanh-
hoa, where a member of the local landed gentry named Le Loi led a
motley band, with the support of the Muong, a non-sinicised people
Sea power, tribute and trade