arbitrator remained and was resorted to on occasions, just as small
powers might call upon the United Nations, with similarly nugatory
effect.
Conclusion
We cannot be certain how the countries of Southeast Asia responded
to this early fifteenth-century projection of Chinese power into the
region, for as usual we have no Southeast Asian source materials. All
we have to go on are the Ming records, written as they were from a
markedly sinocentric point of view. One thing is obvious, however,
just from the frequency of missions sent to China, and that is that trade
was the primary motive. If trade was important for China, despite offi-
cial restrictions, it was the lifeblood of small Southeast Asian
kingdoms. Where it was a royal semi-monopoly, as in Ayutthaya, profit
from trade contributed a substantial proportion of court revenue. After
Yongle abolished restrictions on the frequency of missions, Champa
sent envoys almost every year, while Ayutthaya on several occasions
dispatched two missions in a year, in an effort to maintain the level of
trade in the absence of private commerce. For the smaller port princi-
palities, trade was their major source of revenue. After 1435, when
embassies from Siam and Champa were again limited to one every
three years (a rule subsequently also applied to Java), only illegal chan-
nels were available, which had the effect of concentrating trade in the
hands of Chinese smuggling networks.
A second point to note is that only the rulers of small and vul-
nerable principalities led missions to the Ming court in person. No
king of Champa or Cambodia, let alone Ayutthaya or Majapahit, ever
paid homage to the Son of Heaven. That Chinese emperors preferred
to accept the homage of kings in person is evident from the lavish way
the minor rulers of Melaka and Brunei were received in Beijing, for the
submission of a king enhanced the status of the emperor. Rulers of
Sea power, tribute and trade