included in his provisional coalition government. No sooner had the
Chinese arrived than the French began negotiations for them to leave.
In the meantime, occupying Chinese forces systematically looted
northern Vietnam. They were convinced, with the help of substantial
bribes, to withdraw by 31 March 1946. (Withdrawal was delayed in
Laos so the Chinese could buy up the opium crop.)
The way was at last open for the French reoccupation of Vietnam
that led directly, in December 1946, to the outbreak of the First
Indochina War. Had the French been in a position to return in force
to northern Vietnam immediately following the Japanese surrender,
the subsequent course of events might have been very different. (The
French force that had retreated into China in March 1945 was pre-
vented from returning by Chinese authorities.) The Chinese
occupation, if only for a few months, had been crucial for the support
given to Vietnamese nationalists of all political persuasions, but it left
a nasty taste in Vietnamese mouths. Even the Vietminh were prepared
to tolerate the temporary return of French forces to northern Vietnam
if this would get rid of the Chinese.^11 Chinese withdrawal brought back
the French, but it also deprived nationalist parties like the Dong Minh
Hoi of their political patronage, and so left the Vietminh free to
dispose of their political enemies.
For three years, from the outbreak of fighting until the arrival of
communist Chinese forces on the Sino–Vietnamese border towards
the end of 1949, neither the French nor the Vietminh was able to gain
a decisive advantage. The Vietminh, borrowing extensively from
Maoist theory of revolutionary warfare, established their Viet Bac base
area in the northern mountains close to the border with China, and
built up their political organisation in the countryside. But they
obtained minimal Chinese support, for the GMD was by then well
aware of the communist complexion of the Vietminh and its ties with
the CCP. The French held the major towns and cities, and benefited
from a degree of Chinese cooperation (despite the GMD’s proclaimed
sympathy for Vietnamese independence).
The changing world order