As Nationalist Chinese influence on and interest in the Viet-
minh-led independence struggle in Vietnam dwindled, so communist
Chinese interest and influence increased. The Nationalists retained
consulates in Saigon and Hanoi, but communist Chinese agents
increasingly contested Nationalist influence in the Chinese commu-
nity. Meanwhile in southern China, small locally recruited communist
units worked closely with the Vietminh, seeking sanctuary in Vietnam
when necessary, and offering sanctuary in China in return when Viet-
minh units were hard pressed. But this was a local initiative. The CCP
was far too preoccupied with the civil war to formulate a considered
policy towards the Vietminh, or to provide them with substantial assis-
tance.
By December 1949, Chinese communist forces were approaching
the Vietnamese frontier, pushing before them the remnants of the
defeated Nationalist First Army Corps. Under an agreement with the
French, 30 000 Nationalist troops and dependents were permitted to
enter Vietnam, where they were disarmed and interned. Most were
eventually repatriated to Taiwan, though not until 1953.^12 To the west,
in Yunnan, remnants of the GMD Eighth Army retreated into north-
eastern Shan state, without Burmese permission and against the
government’s wishes. Their presence would be a source of instability
and diplomatic friction for years to come.
Conclusion
Like the late Qing, Nationalist China was intent on rebuilding
Chinese prestige and status, and from an equally weak position.
Attempts to expand Chinese influence in Southeast Asia were
blocked, however, by the presence of European colonial powers. The
only avenue remained the overseas Chinese. Whereas the Qing saw
the overseas Chinese primarily in Middle Kingdom terms (that is, as
subjects expected to assist China), the Nationalists saw them as a
A Short History of China and Southeast Asia