communist parties were when they were still illegal, so historical
experience adds to the paranoia. Enemies are all around, operating in
secret, and this extends to the international arena. The Chinese
regime has always believed that other governments were plotting its
downfall. It was Mao himself who warned about the dangers of ‘peace-
ful evolution’ as an imperialist strategy to undermine and destroy the
Chinese revolution. Such suspicion has been a hallmark of the PRC’s
international relations culture, as it has been of Southeast Asian com-
munist states (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia under the Khmer
Rouge).
Early PRC–Southeast Asia relations
The CCP came to power in the bipolar international environment of
the Cold War, after years of civil conflict and in desperate need of
foreign assistance. It saw no alternative, therefore, but to ‘lean to one
side’ and enter into formal alliance with the Soviet Union, which it
did in February 1950. It was always going to be a difficult relationship,
for reasons outlined above, and one that in retrospect could not last,
though this was not immediately apparent. For political elites in
Southeast Asia, some already struggling against homegrown commu-
nist insurgencies, world communism not only had moved frighteningly
closer, but also had new and powerful means at its disposal to support
revolution.
Within a year, the PRC conclusively demonstrated its prepared-
ness to use those means. In September 1950, a Vietminh offensive was
launched with substantial Chinese assistance against French garrisons
in northern Vietnam close to the border—with China. A month later,
Chinese ‘volunteers’ poured into Korea, driving United Nations forces
back below the 38th parallel. Together these two events caused con-
siderable anxiety and hardened attitudes among non-communist
Southeast Asian political elites already subject to blistering criticism
A Short History of China and Southeast Asia