over Radio Beijing as ‘running dogs of imperialism’. It seemed that
Beijing was ready to back its strong words of support for revolutionary
movements by decisive deeds.
Nowhere did the spectre of Chinese intervention loom larger
than in Burma with its long and porous land border with the PRC, and
in Vietnam (see below). The government of Burmese Prime Minister
U Nu feared direct Chinese support, including military ‘volunteers’, for
the Burmese Communist Party’s insurrection; or even invasion by
Chinese communist forces on the pretext of pursuing GMD remnants
that had crossed the Burmese border. In an effort to prevent such inter-
vention, Burma adopted a policy of strict neutrality in foreign affairs,
and dispatched units of its own hard-pressed army to harass the
unwanted GMD troops. The Burmese severed all connections with
Britain, gave no support to the UN in Korea (unlike Thailand), and
refrained from commenting on China’s brutal ‘liberation’ of Buddhist
Tibet.
Burmese neutralism did not derive solely from a realistic assess-
ment of immediate circumstances. That was obviously one factor, but
the Burmese response also drew upon a bilateral relations regime with
China that had deep historical and cultural roots. Geography made
Burma and China neighbours, but frontiers were always ill defined—
and still were in the 1950s. Between the Han Chinese and Burman
heartlands lived a bewildering number of ethnic minorities, which
each in the past had attempted to draw into its political orbit. Con-
tacts had mostly been peaceful and commercial, but trade routes could
always become routes of invasion. Even powerful Burmese dynasties
had recognised the threat that China posed. Any Chinese incursion
was vigorously resisted, though China was afterwards placated through
the dispatch of a Burmese embassy. And while Burmese conquerors fre-
quently marched their armies against the Tai world, they mostly
refrained from provoking China.
Another important historical lesson for Burma has been that
strength comes from unity enforced by strong centralised power. Power
Communism and the Cold War