struggles at the centre, particularly succession disputes, weakened the
Burmese mandalaand left it open to intervention by its neighbours.
Experience of the British colonial policy of divide and rule only re-
inforced this lesson. To a certain extent, the threat of intervention was
reduced through isolation and reliance on geography to protect the
core heartland of the Irrawaddy valley. But this needed to be backed by
diplomacy. Neutrality was designed to minimise possible external
interference while the government attempted to strengthen the power
of the centre and unify the country.
Resistance and placation were the two poles of the traditional
Burmese response to China. The Burmese accepted what they
described as a paukphaw(sibling) relationship that accorded China
seniority within the same family. Beijing was remote and un-
predictable, so it was always wise to maintain formally friendly
relations at comfortably extended intervals. In the meantime the
Burmese were free to shape their own world, by the perennial means
in a fluctuating mandalaof conquest of Mon, Shan, and other minor
principalities. A similar approach in 1950 seemed entirely logical to
Rangoon. China would be placated, leaving the Burman ruling elite
free to recreate an independent Burmese state through internal
conquest (of the BCP, the Karen, and any other minority that might
challenge Burman domination). Thus was the external security
environment stabilised in order to focus on the internal environment.
The Burmese approach worked. During the Korean conflict,
China wanted no second front in the south. Support for the Vietminh
kept the French busy in Indochina; Thailand, allied with the US
though it was, had no common border across which to threaten
Yunnan. But an independent Burma allied with the West could have
posed a danger, not least to the Chinese position in Tibet. Better to
encourage Burmese neutrality (leaning to China), than to back the
BCP. In its dealing with Burma, Beijing showed that vocal encourage-
ment for revolutionary movements did not necessarily translate into
material support. A gap opened up between words and deeds because
A Short History of China and Southeast Asia