At Geneva, China’s own security needs took precedence over
Vietnamese interests. In the global context of the Cold War, however,
Chinese security depended primarily on the attitude of the United
States. Beijing sought a settlement in Indochina that would reduce the
threat to China from American imperialism. The armistice in Korea
had established North Korea as a protective shield along China’s
northeastern frontier. Beijing wanted a similar protective zone in
Indochina. Support for the division of Vietnam, and for neutral, non-
communist governments in Laos and Cambodia, was designed to head
off a major American commitment to Indochina.
Chinese leaders had two additional goals, however, that reveal
much about Chinese grand strategy. One was China’s desire to be
taken seriously as a major power; the other was to exert greater politi-
cal influence in Southeast Asia. For the first five years of the regime’s
existence, during the Korean War, Beijing had been internationally
isolated. China had no representation in the United Nations, and
Britain alone among the great powers had recognised the PRC.
Geneva provided a world stage, on which China could demonstrate
that it was a major diplomatic player. Zhou Enlai, consummate diplo-
mat that he was, set out to convince the more amenable Western
powers (Britain and France) that China was both reasonable and
responsible, and so divide them from the hard-line Americans. His
success at Geneva greatly enhanced China’s international standing,
much to Beijing’s satisfaction.^9
China’s success, however, came at the expense of the Viet-
namese. First, under Chinese urging, the DRV was convinced to
abandon its pretense that it had no forces in Laos or Cambodia and to
agree to their withdrawal. This led to recognition of non-communist
governments in both countries that were beholden to China for
removing, if only temporarily, the threat of Vietnamese domination.
Then, under intense pressure from both the Soviets and Chinese, the
DRV delegation was forced to accept the interim partition of Vietnam
at the seventeenth parallel. This was supposedly to allow the French
A Short History of China and Southeast Asia