The political discontent of the late 1950s in Indonesia culmi-
nated in Sukarno’s decision, in July 1959, to replace parliamentary
democracy with what he called ‘guided democracy’. This allowed
Sukarno to seize the political initiative by playing the PKI off against
the army, but it meant that his ascendancy rested on a ‘fragile balance’
between antagonistic political forces. Only foreign policy offered an
opportunity to unite these forces behind him. Sukarno enlisted both
the PKI and the army in support of his revolutionary aims, first to ‘lib-
erate’ West Irian from Dutch rule, and then to ‘confront’ the new state
of Malaysia, formed in September 1963, comprising Malaya, Singapore
and the British Borneo territories of Sabah and Sarawak. (Brunei was
not included, and Singapore was expelled in August 1965.)
Indonesia’s shift to an overtly anti-imperialist foreign policy was
welcomed by Beijing, not least because it directed attention away from
the internal problem of the Indonesian overseas Chinese. As the area
of agreement expanded, a so-called ‘Jakarta–Beijing axis’ developed.
Indonesia withdrew from the United Nations to become self-styled
leader of the ‘new emerging forces’ challenging the ‘old established
forces’ (principally the West), whose influence Sukarno believed was
on the wane. When Sukarno challenged the creation of Malaysia,
Beijing lent its support. Chinese aid was increased, though not enough
to compensate for reductions not just in American aid, but in Soviet
assistance as well. Confrontation, therefore, left Indonesia increasingly
dependent on, and allied with, Beijing.
At the same time, party-to-party relations warmed between the
CCP and the PKI. The PKI had attempted to tread a middle path in
the Sino–Soviet dispute, while developing its own non-revolutionary
strategy of seeking power through its political alliance with
Sukarno. Though the Chinese had reservations about this non-
Maoist strategy, they allowed that it might suit Indonesian
conditions. Close relations between the PKI and the CCP were a
poison chalice, however. Not only did they place the PKI in a diffi-
cult position with respect to the overseas Chinese, they also stirred
A Short History of China and Southeast Asia