presided over a secret meeting in southern China, bringing together
the leaders of the DRV, the Pathet Lao, and the PKI (represented by
its secretary-general, D. N. Aidit), to develop a coordinated revolu-
tionary strategy for Southeast Asia, based on communist movements
in Indochina and Indonesia. Had this strategy been successful, China’s
influence in the region and the world would have taken a quantum
leap forward. With the collapse of its Indonesia policy, China drew
back, just as it had after the Ming voyages, to busy itself with the threat
from the north (the Soviet Union) and with its own internal politics
(during the Cultural Revolution). The impact of both reverberated,
not in Indonesia, but in Indochina.
The Second Indochina War
Despite the disappointment of the Geneva agreements of 1954, rela-
tions between China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
remained close and friendly. The nagging question of boundaries and
possession of the Paracel and Spratly islands were put to one side. The
Vietnamese were learning, however, that Chinese revolutionary prece-
dent could not simply be applied in Vietnam. Nor did Chinese advice,
despite the authoritative way in which it was given, always provide the
best solution. A case in point was the land reform program in North
Vietnam, whose excesses led to the first mass demonstrations against
the regime. Vietnam declined to introduce communes, and was not
tempted to emulate China’s Great Leap Forward. As for southern
Vietnam, Chinese advice, in the name of peaceful coexistence, was to
pursue political struggle and avoid armed uprising. When the decision
was taken in 1959 by a much more mature and experienced Viet-
namese communist leadership to resume insurgency in the south, it
was without seeking Chinese approval.^12
Once the decision was taken, Beijing offered full support, even
while coping with the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward. The
A Short History of China and Southeast Asia